The Right to Remain Armed by Bellin, Jeffrey
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 93 Issue 1 
2015 
The Right to Remain Armed 
Jeffrey Bellin 
William & Mary Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law 
Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Second Amendment 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey Bellin, The Right to Remain Armed, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Washington University 
Law Review 
 
VOLUME 93 NUMBER 1 2015 
 
THE RIGHT TO REMAIN ARMED 
JEFFREY BELLIN

 
ABSTRACT 
The laws governing gun possession are changing rapidly. In the past 
two years, federal courts have wielded a revitalized Second Amendment to 
invalidate longstanding gun carrying restrictions in Chicago, the District 
of Columbia, and throughout California. Invoking similar Second 
Amendment themes, legislators across the country have steadily 
deregulated public gun carrying, preempting municipal gun control 
ordinances in cities like Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Cleveland. 
These changes to substantive gun laws reverberate through the 
constitutional criminal procedure framework. By making it lawful for 
citizens to carry guns even in crowded urban areas, enhanced Second 
Amendment rights trigger Fourth Amendment protections that could 
radically transform American policing. Evidence of handgun possession—
whether from a tip or observation—is increasingly an inadequate 
justification for a Fourth Amendment stop; officers will struggle to 
articulate legal grounds for temporarily disarming citizens during face-to-
face encounters; and the promise of gun-detecting technology as an 
alternative to invasive investigative techniques, such as pretextual arrests 
and frisks, may be squelched. Whether observers view these implications 
as beneficial, disastrous, or something in between, one thing is clear: 
courts, policymakers, and academics must begin to address the dramatic 
Fourth Amendment implications of an expanding Second Amendment 
“right to remain armed.”  
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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2012, a deranged gunman killed twenty children and six 
adults at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut.
1
 
The school shooting sparked a national debate about firearms and, 
momentarily, raised the specter of a renewed push for gun control 
legislation.
2
 In the end, however, the tragedy served only to highlight the 
 
 
 1. Steve Vogel et al., Sandy Hook Elementary Shooting Leaves 28 Dead, Law Enforcement 
Sources Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sandy-hook-
elementary-school-shooting-leaves-students-staff-dead/2012/12/14/24334570-461e-11e2-8e70-e19935 
28222d_story.html. 
 2. Philip Rucker & Peter Wallsten, Biden’s Gun Task Force Met with All Sides, but Kept Its Eye 
on the Target, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/bidens-gun-task-
force-met-with-all-sides-but-kept-its-eye-on-the-target/2013/01/19/520d77a6-60c5-11e2-b05a-605528 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/6
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power of countervailing forces in American society. Guns were indeed on 
the legislative agenda following Sandy Hook, but legislators generally 
sought to expand, not restrict, gun rights. In the year following the Sandy 
Hook shooting, almost every state enacted at least one new gun law, but 
“[n]early two-thirds of the new laws ease restrictions and expand the rights 
of gun owners.”3 Punctuating this trend, in 2014, Georgia enacted the 
“Safe Carry Protection Act,” labeled by critics the “Guns Everywhere” 
law.
4
 The law abolishes most limits on where people can carry firearms, 
loosens restrictions on who can carry a gun, and curbs the ability of police 
to investigate whether a person carrying a gun possesses a license.
5
 
In the dwindling number of jurisdictions where legislators continue to 
support strict gun regulation, judges, rather than politicians, spearhead the 
gun-rights movement. The United States Supreme Court opened the 
judicial front in 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller,
6
 ruling that “the 
District’s ban on handgun possession in the home violates the Second 
Amendment.”7 Heller’s broader implications came into focus in 2014, 
when the Ninth Circuit applied the case to mandate that California cities 
permit law-abiding citizens to carry handguns in public.
8
 
 
 
f6b712_story.html (describing efforts of task force appointed by President Obama in wake of Sandy 
Hook shooting). 
 3. Karen Yourish et al., State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year Since Newtown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-laws-enacted-in-the-year-since-
newtown.html?_r=0 (surveying state legislation after Sandy Hook); see also Michael Cooper, Debate 
on Gun Control Is Revived, amid a Trend Toward Fewer Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/16/us/politics/connecticut-shooting-revives-gun-control-debate. html? 
_r=0 (contrasting anti-gun reaction to Sandy Hook with nationwide trend of expanding gun rights).  
 4. Larry Copeland & Doug Richards, Ga. Governor Signs ‘Guns Everywhere’ into Law, USA 
TODAY (Apr. 23, 2014, 4:17 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/04/23/georgia-
gun-law/8046315/. 
 5. Safe Carry Protection Act, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1-5 (Ga. 2014), 
available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-US/display/20132014/HB/60 (amending Ga. Code 
to permit concealed firearms in bars, places of worship, and most government buildings); id. §§ 1-6, 
1-9 (expanding authority to permit concealed firearms in schools); id. § 1-7 (providing that persons 
under twenty-one but at least eighteen years of age with military service can obtain a concealed carry 
license and removing disqualification for persons convicted of “[p]ointing a gun or a pistol at 
another”); id. § 1-10 (prohibiting detention for the sole purpose of determining whether a person with a 
weapon has a license). 
 6. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 7. Id. at 635. 
 8. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014) (invalidating California’s 
restrictive licensing framework as applied in San Diego), vacated and reh’g granted en banc, 781 F.3d 
1106 (9th Cir. 2015); Ed Joyce, With Restrictions Relaxed, Thousands Apply to Carry Concealed 
Firearms in OC, KPCC (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/news/2014/04/14/43439/good-cause-
gone-orange-county-sheriff-issuing-conc/ (reporting that, after Peruta, “3,500 [people] have applied” 
in the county for a concealed weapons permit, even though the county “typically get[s] about 500 
applications a year” and averages, “at any given time, about 940” licensed concealed weapons 
holders). 
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The sweeping changes to America’s substantive gun laws reverberate 
throughout American policing. Particularly in America’s cities, efforts to 
combat violent crime center on gun-policing strategies, colloquially 
known as “getting guns off the streets.”9 Echoes of this effort can be found 
in the earliest days of the Republic, and the strategy has become 
increasingly prominent in modern times.
10
 Urban police chiefs identified 
handgun violence as the driving force in America’s violent crime surge in 
the 1970s and 1980s.
11
 Municipal policymakers reacted aggressively, 
enacting strict licensing regimes and handgun prohibitions.
12
 
Strict gun regulations are designed to prevent violent crimes, like 
homicide and robbery, by empowering police to detect and deter public 
handgun carrying. Seeking to prevent incipient street crimes, officers stop 
people who appear to be armed—including those acting otherwise 
lawfully—citing suspicion of unlawful gun possession as the basis for the 
intrusion.
13
 This form of gun policing drove the infamous New York City 
“stop and frisk” program; in the forms documenting the hundreds of 
thousands of stops conducted in the city in recent years, officers most 
frequently cited suspected “weapons possession” as the justification for a 
stop.
14
 
Dramatic changes in the nation’s substantive gun laws erode the 
constitutional underpinnings of urban gun policing. The Fourth 
 
 
 9. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness 
of New York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1500–20 (2014) (chronicling evolution of 
New York City Stop and Frisk); sources cited infra notes 11, 32. 
 10. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 85 (2013) (arguing that “perhaps 
no characteristic of gun control in the United States is as ‘longstanding’ as the stricter regulation of 
guns in cities than in rural areas” and providing examples); Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms 
Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1695, 1726 (2012) (“A broad range of restrictions on the use of arms in public, including bans on the 
right to carry in public, emerged in the decades after the adoption of the Second Amendment.”). 
 11. See, e.g., RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI & WILLIAM J. BRATTON, POLICE STRATEGY NO. 1: 
GETTING GUNS OFF THE STREETS OF NEW YORK 4 (1994) (“In 1960, there were 75 homicides 
committed in the city with handguns, representing a quarter of the total number of murders for the 
year. In 1992, there were 1,500 homicides . . . committed with handguns, representing three quarters of 
the total number of murders . . . .”); see also ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008 17 (2011), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf (reflecting percentage of homicides from 1980 to 
2008 that involved guns); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, 
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 470 (2000) (“Homicide trends in 
New York City since 1985 provided strong empirical support for emphasizing gun violence in 
enforcement policy.”). 
 12. See infra Part I.A. 
 13. See infra Part I.B. 
 14. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 1500–20 (describing evolution of New York City Stop and Frisk); 
see also infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/6
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Amendment generally requires police to possess “individualized 
suspicion” of a crime prior to conducting any search or seizure.15 When 
police try to preempt violent crime by stopping (i.e., seizing) armed 
citizens, the assumed violation of municipal gun laws supplies the 
requisite Fourth Amendment authority.
16 
As gun carrying becomes both 
lawful and common, even in major cities, police lose the ability to invoke 
public gun possession as a Fourth-Amendment-satisfying basis for 
investigation.
17
 
The emerging reality across America, including its cities, is that 
carrying a concealed handgun is a perfectly “lawful act.”18 In Florida 
alone, the number of active concealed handgun carrying (“concealed 
carry”) licenses climbed from 33,000 in 1988 to just over 1.4 million in 
2015—covering roughly eight percent of Floridians.19 The most recent 
estimate of active concealed carry licenses across America places the 
number at over 11 million (up from 4.6 million in 2007), or almost five 
percent of the population.
20
 These ballooning numbers will eventually 
force judges (and police officers) to acknowledge that gun possession 
alone is a constitutionally dubious justification for a search or seizure. In 
light of the resurgent Second Amendment’s softening of gun restrictions, 
urban police long trained to spring into action at the sight of a firearm may 
now be violating the Fourth Amendment when they do so.
21
 Once seen as 
a lawful basis for searches and seizures, reports and observations of armed 
people, whether in the District of Columbia’s pedestrian mall or the local 
 
 
 15. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (stating that “some quantum 
of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure”). 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part II.C. 
 18. See, e.g., Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[C]arrying a concealed 
weapon pursuant to a valid concealed carry permit is a lawful act.”). 
 19. DIV. OF LICENSING, FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND CONSUMER SERVS., NUMBER OF VALID 
FLORIDA CONCEALED WEAPON LICENSES (2015), available at http://www.freshfromflorida.com/ 
content/download/7504/118881/NumberOfValidCWLicenses_FiscalYearEndSince1987-1988.pdf (noting 
total number of valid licenses as reported at the end of each fiscal year since 1988). 
 20. CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR., CONCEALED CARRY PERMIT HOLDERS ACROSS THE 
UNITED STATES 4–5 (2014), available at http://crimepreventionresearchcenter.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/07/Concealed-Carry-Permit-Holders-Across-the-United-States.pdf; cf. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-717, GUN CONTROL: STATES’ LAWS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR 
CONCEALED CARRY PERMITS VARY ACROSS THE NATION 1 (2012) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting 
that States reported “approximately 8 million active concealed carry permits” as of December 31, 
2011, but emphasizing that this “number is likely understated” because some states provided no 
estimate of permits issued); PHILIP J. COOK & KRISTIN A. GOSS, THE GUN DEBATE 22, 107 (2014) 
(noting 8 million statistic without citation but labeling it “very conservative”). 
 21. See, e.g., Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1133–34 (6th Cir. 2015) 
(ruling that police officer, responding to 911 call, who stopped person carrying a handgun could be 
liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Fourth Amendment). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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shopping mall, may increasingly be met with shrugs from police officers 
who, legally speaking, have no basis to act. 
America is engaged in two great debates: one regarding the proper 
limits of police efforts to proactively suppress crime, and another about 
the proper role of firearms in public.
22
 This Article demonstrates that these 
debates, while generally conducted in isolation, are closely intertwined. It 
does so in three parts, roughly delineating the past, present, and future. 
Part I (the past) describes the traditional gun-policing tactics employed by 
urban police forces to suppress violent crime. Part II (the present) explains 
how the transforming gun-rights landscape undermines the Fourth 
Amendment validity of these staples of gun-oriented policing. Part III (the 
future) analyzes legal strategies that cities will likely turn to as courts and 
legislators increasingly invalidate restrictive gun laws. This final Part 
forecasts that local policymakers will try to suppress gun carrying and 
detect and deter unlawful gun possession by: (1) raising the minimum age 
for obtaining a “concealed carry” license; and (2) requiring lawfully armed 
citizens to present their license, upon request, to inquiring police officers. 
These efforts to reduce the number of lawful gun possessors and facilitate 
the detection and disarming of unlicensed gun possessors could approach 
the effectiveness of traditional urban gun-policing efforts because licensed 
gun possessors commit only a tiny fraction of violent street crime.
23
 As 
Part III explains, however, these approaches are themselves subject to 
constitutional challenge and may generate unintended negative policy 
consequences, such as abusive police practices and racial profiling.
24
 The 
discussion ultimately raises as many questions as it answers, but one 
theme resonates throughout: the emerging Second and Fourth Amendment 
“right to remain armed” has the potential to radically transform American 
policing.  
 
 
 22. See Bellin, supra note 9 (discussing controversy surrounding New York City Stop and Frisk); 
Jeffrey Bellin, What We Should Learn from Garner and Ferguson Cases, CNN (Dec. 9, 2014, 10:32 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/08/opinion/bellin-prosecutors-killings-by-police/index.html?hpt= 
hp_t1 (addressing controversy surrounding recent police deadly force cases); sources cited supra notes 
2–3 (discussing controversy surrounding gun control proposals). 
 23. See infra Part III.A. 
 24. See infra Part III.B.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/6
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I. URBAN GUN POLICING 
City residents absorb a fearsome and disproportionate share of 
America’s gun crime, often in the form of robberies and murder.25 
Municipal efforts to combat these crimes target firearms, and particularly 
handguns.
26
 One of the most vivid examples of this focus emerged in New 
York City in 1993 when voters, reacting to a cresting street crime 
epidemic, elected Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who installed William Bratton 
as Police Commissioner.
27
 Bratton crunched the numbers and determined 
that handguns were the principal driver of New York City’s crime wave.28 
The first policy document promulgated by Bratton’s police department 
(the “NYPD”), Police Strategy No. 1: Getting Guns off the Streets of New 
York, reported that between 1960 and 1992, the city experienced an almost 
two-thousand percent increase in homicides committed with handguns (a 
type of homicide that had grown from one quarter to three quarters of all 
 
 
 25. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Urban 
areas such as Chicago suffer disproportionately from this epidemic of violence. Handguns contribute 
disproportionately to it.”); DETIS T. DUHART, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 182031, URBAN, 
SUBURBAN, AND RURAL VICTIMIZATION, 1993–98 4, 9 (2000), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/usrv98.pdf (reporting that urban residents were victimized by violent crime 74% more 
often than rural residents and 37% more often than suburbanites and that “[u]rban violent offenders 
were more likely than offenders elsewhere (12% urban versus 9% suburban and 8% rural) to use a 
firearm”); Blocher, supra note 10, at 100 (explaining that “though the empirics are messy and 
contested, gun crime is clearly an urban problem” and discussing empirical evidence); CDC, Violence-
Related Firearm Deaths Among Residents of Metropolitan Areas and Cities—United States, 2006-
2007, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 573, 574 (2011), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6018.pdf (concluding based on empirical analysis that “firearm homicide rates 
tended to be higher with increasing urbanization”). 
 26. See Brief of Violence Policy Center and the Police Chiefs for the Cities of Los Angeles, 
Minneapolis, and Seattle as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 136348 (representing views of “the Chiefs of Police for 
three of the nation’s largest cities: Los Angeles, Seattle, and Minneapolis” who “are keenly aware of 
the devastation caused by handguns in American cities” and “have a substantial interest in enacting 
and upholding handgun restrictions in order to protect the lives of their citizens and their officers”); 
GEORGE L. KELLING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 178259, “BROKEN WINDOWS” AND POLICE 
DISCRETION 9 (1999) (“Increasingly, police are under renewed and constant pressure from 
neighborhood groups and city halls across the country . . . to ‘do something now’ about . . . getting 
guns off the street, and regaining control over public places.”); Jon S. Vernick et al., Technologies to 
Detect Concealed Weapons: Fourth Amendment Limits on a New Public Health and Law Enforcement 
Tool, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 567, 567 (2003) (“In the 1980s and 1990s, police departments across the 
country began to develop and implement strategies to address illegal weapons carrying. Often these 
strategies have involved aggressive efforts to identify and physically search individuals suspected of 
illegally carrying a firearm.”). 
 27. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER 47–48 (2001) (indicating that “Giuliani 
appointed William Bratton police commissioner in December 1993,” soon after Giuliani was elected); 
WILLIAM BRATTON WITH PETER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND 194–95 (1998) (describing process of being 
hired to head NYPD in December 1993 to January 1994). 
 28. BRATTON, supra note 27, at 218. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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city murders).
29
 The strategy document concluded that “[i]llegal guns—
particularly handguns—are an unrelenting and growing plague in New 
York.”30 This insight forecasted the NYPD’s subsequent policing 
strategies. Over the next decades, the NYPD engaged in a concerted effort 
to rid the streets of handguns, employing specialized units tasked with 
seizing firearms, mass stop-and-frisk, pretextual arrests, and other 
measures—all intended to detect and deter public gun possession and 
“get[] guns off the streets.”31 While New York City’s efforts received the 
most attention, they differed only in degree from those of American cities 
across the country.
32
 This Part summarizes the legal framework that 
undergirds urban gun-suppression efforts—a framework that, as explained 
in Part II, may no longer be constitutional in light of sweeping changes to 
the nation’s gun laws. 
A. Strict Licensing Regimes  
Efforts to keep guns off city streets begin with laws restricting public 
gun possession. American cities traditionally employed two approaches: 
prohibitions and licensing. Although prohibitions are all but extinct, they 
previously formed the backbone of urban gun-policing efforts in two 
major American cities. Most prominently, starting in the late 1970s and for 
decades thereafter, the District of Columbia essentially prohibited 
handguns after determining that the city’s licensing regime had “not been 
sufficiently effective in reducing the potentiality of gun-related deaths and 
 
 
 29. GIULIANI & BRATTON, supra note 11, at 4. 
 30. Id. at 4–5 (“[New Yorkers] are afraid for a reason, and that reason has mainly to do with 
handguns.”).  
 31. See id.; Bellin, supra note 9, at 1500–20 (chronicling evolution of New York City Stop and 
Frisk). 
 32. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Introduction: Guns, Crime, and Punishment in America, 43 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 261, 262 (2001) (“Urban police departments are pursuing gun-oriented policing strategies 
focused on increased stop-and-frisk encounters and misdemeanor arrests as a way to get guns off the 
streets.”); Tracey L. Meares, The Law and Social Science of Stop and Frisk, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 335, 339 (2014) (explaining that “[s]cores of cities rushed to follow the Kansas City model [of 
gun-oriented policing], including perhaps most famously, New York City”); Lawrence W. Sherman, In 
Remembrance: James Wilford Shaw, Criminologist, THE CRIMINOLOGIST (AM. SOC’Y OF 
CRIMINOLOGY, Columbus, OH), Sept.–Oct. 1995, at 23 (emphasizing Shaw’s influence by stating as 
“[a] conservative estimate” that “over 100 other police agencies adopted” aggressive gun interdiction 
efforts modeled on Shaw’s empirical findings in Kansas City); Gus G. Sentementes, Police Step up 
Frisking Tactic, BALTIMORE SUN (Nov. 13, 2005), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2005-11-13/news/ 
0511130098_1_frisking-deter-crime-police-officers/3 (reporting on aggressive stop and frisk tactics in 
high crime areas of Baltimore intended to “seize guns and prevent violence”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss1/6
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gun-related crimes from occurring within the District of Columbia.”33 In 
1983, Chicago similarly banned handguns to “protect its residents ‘from 
the loss of property and injury or death from firearms.’”34 Other cities, 
such as San Francisco, attempted to ban handguns at various points in their 
history with limited success.
35
 
More commonly, cities limit public gun possession by restricting 
visible weapons carrying (“open carry”) and prohibiting the carrying of 
concealed handguns without a “concealed carry” permit issued by local 
police authorities.
36
 By giving local officials, such as the police 
commissioner, broad discretion to deny permits, states allow cities to 
severely limit public gun possession even as less crime-plagued rural areas 
freely allow licensed handgun carrying.
37
 
Against a backdrop of “open carry” prohibitions in their respective 
states, New York City and San Diego exemplify the strict licensing model 
of gun control. To carry a concealed handgun in New York City, an 
applicant must demonstrate “proper cause” to the NYPD.38 The standard is 
stringent: “the mere fact that an applicant has been the victim of a crime or 
resides in or is employed in a ‘high crime area,’ does not establish ‘proper 
cause’ for the issuance of a carry or special handgun license.”39 Instead, 
 
 
 33. McIntosh v. Washington, 395 A.2d 744, 754 (D.C. 1978) (quoting STAFF OF H. COMM. ON 
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 94TH CONG., REP. ON THE JUDICIARY & CRIM. LAW (Comm. Print 
1976)). 
 34. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2010) (quoting city council 
proceedings). 
 35. Fiscal v. City of San Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 335–36 (Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating 
San Francisco ordinance as preempted by state law); see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 938 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “some municipalities ban handguns, even in States that constitutionally protect 
the right to bear arms,” and citing examples); Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District 
of Columbia v. Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 145–46 (2009) 
(“At least ten municipalities, including San Francisco, Oakland, Chicago and many of its neighboring 
municipalities, Memphis, Toledo, and Cambridge, have at least at one time enacted handgun 
regulations comparable to those of the District.”). 
 36. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1147–48 (9th Cir. 2014) (detailing 
California firearm licensing rules); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.03(3) (2014) (prohibiting an unlicensed 
person from “possess[ing] any loaded firearm” outside of the home or place of business). These laws 
have a lengthy pedigree. See Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In 
1881, New York prohibited the concealed carrying of ‘any kind of fire-arms.’”). 
 37. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:58-4(c) (2000) (requiring concealed carry license to be issued 
by “the chief police officer of the municipality in which the applicant resides”); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 265.00(10) (2014) (defining pertinent licensing officers under New York law). 
 38. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 38, § 5-03 (2014), available at http://rules.cityofnewyork.us/content/ 
section-5-03-carry-and-special-handgun-licenses; see also Sanchez v. Kelly, 799 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Sup. 
Ct. 2004) (unpublished table disposition) (describing NYPD’s “[e]xtraordinary power” in issuing 
concealed carry permits); Goldstein v. Brown, 592 N.Y.S.2d 343, 344 (App. Div. 1993) (reviewing 
concealed carry permit denial and describing broad discretion provided to NYPD decisions).  
 39. § 5-03. 
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the NYPD requires evidence of “[e]xposure of the applicant to 
extraordinary personal danger, documented by proof of recurrent threats to 
life or safety requiring authorization to carry a handgun.”40 The NYPD 
rarely grants concealed carry licenses.
41
  
San Diego similarly restricts issuance of concealed carry licenses to 
applicants showing “good cause,” defined as “[a] set of circumstances that 
distinguish the applicant from the mainstream and causes him or her to be 
placed in harm’s way”; concern for “one’s personal safety alone is not 
considered good cause.”42 San Diego County delegates the determination 
of whether this standard is met to the County Sheriff.
43
 Under the policy, 
there are about 1100 active concealed weapons permits in San Diego, 
representing slightly more than .03% of the population.
44
 California’s 
other major cities are reportedly even more restrictive: as of March 2014, 
“Los Angeles County had a few hundred [active concealed weapons 
permits], while counties in the Bay Area each have fewer than 200, with 
San Francisco clocking in with just two.”45 
B. Detecting Noncompliance 
Laws prohibiting or severely restricting public gun possession do not 
enforce themselves. Consequently, urban policymakers expect police 
officers to seek out guns and arrest those who carry them unlawfully. The 
mechanisms for performing this task vary. This Part catalogues the most 
commonly employed tactics. As discussed in Part II, the recent expansion 
 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 953 (7th Cir. 2012) (Williams, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “New York City rarely [issues permits] and so has been characterized as maintaining a virtual ban 
on handguns”); CRIME PREVENTION RESEARCH CTR., supra note 20, at 10, 13 (reporting that New 
York City had 5700 active permits as of 2010, or .09% of the population); Sewell Chan, Annie Hall, 
Get Your Gun, N.Y. TIMES CITY ROOM BLOG (Dec. 2, 2008, 1:13 PM), http://cityroom.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2008/12/02/a-guide-to-city-gun-licenses/?_r=0 (providing breakdown of concealed carry 
permit numbers for New York City and noting mayor’s desire to reduce the number); John Marzulli, 
Gun Permits KOD NYPD Shoots Down 55% Of Renewals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 4, 1999, 12:00 
AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/gun-permits-kod-nypd-shoots-55-renewals-article-
1.835934 (detailing difficulty of obtaining a concealed carry license in New York City and the low 
number of permits issued). 
 42. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Randy Dotinga, 5 Things to Know About Concealed Guns in SD, VOICE OF SAN DIEGO (Mar. 
7, 2014), http://voiceofsandiego.org/2014/03/07/5-things-to-know-about-concealed-guns-in-sd/. About 
3.2 million people live in San Diego County. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: San 
Diego County, California, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06073.html (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2015). 
 45. Dotinga, supra note 44. 
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of gun rights calls into question the constitutionality of these gun-policing 
tactics. Interestingly, the most significant impact of changing gun laws 
may be on a tactic yet to see widespread adoption, but perhaps most 
important to future generations: gun-detection technology. 
1. Observations, Tips, and Admissions 
Police often detect guns through public observation. Officers patrol the 
streets alert to signs of gun possession, such as bulges under clothing or 
protruding handles. The late Jack Maple, a key Bratton deputy, describes 
in his memoir how he taught himself to “spot people carrying guns” so he 
could “save a few lives” by getting the guns off the street.46 Maple 
explained the “drill” as follows: after seeing a suspicious bulge, he would 
make his “first move by grabbing the handle of [the suspect’s] gun. [The 
suspect] freezes and usually obeys an order to put his hands on his head. If 
he doesn’t, my hold on his gun and waistband put him off-balance, so I 
can spin him around and get cuffs on him anyway.”47 Maple bragged that 
as a patrol officer, he would “stop two or three people a day who were 
carrying concealed weapons.”48 
Police also receive reports from citizens about guns carried by others. 
A Seventh Circuit case provides a representative fact pattern: 
One afternoon a uniformed police officer on patrol in his car . . . 
received a message from his dispatcher conveying an anonymous 
tip that at the corner of Main and Calhoun Streets was a black man 
wearing a tan shirt and tan shorts who had a gun in his waistband.
49
 
 
 
 46. JACK MAPLE, THE CRIME FIGHTER 42 (1999). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. Maple notes that “[m]any of the guns were licensed; some were not.” Id.; cf. Timothy 
McVeigh Trial: Documents Relating to McVeigh’s Arrest and the Search of His Vehicle, UMKC, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveigharrest.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter Testimony of Oklahoma State Trooper Hanger] (providing a copy of the transcript of the 
testimony of Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger discussing his stop of Timothy McVeigh 
when he noticed a “bulge under McVeigh’s left arm”; after McVeigh said he had a gun, the trooper 
testified that he “grabbed for the bulge,” “removed [his] pistol from [his] holster and stuck it to the 
back of [McVeigh’s] head”); United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1541, 1546 (D. Colo. 1996) 
(discussing stop). 
 49. United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 885 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding subsequent stop); see 
also United States v. Shaw, 874 F. Supp. 2d 13, 22 (D. Mass. 2012) (reporting confidential informant 
tip that “he had seen the two men [subsequently stopped by police] with the gun”); In re D.M., 781 
A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 2001) (evaluating Philadelphia stop initiated by “an anonymous telephone call 
reporting that appellant was on a specific corner with a gun” and deeming Terry stop constitutional 
when suspect fled upon approach of police). 
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A similar anonymous tip formed the prelude to a Supreme Court case, 
where police responded to a tip that a person “standing at a particular bus 
stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”50 
Another gun-detection tactic takes advantage of case law that deems 
“consensual encounters” unregulated by the Fourth Amendment.51 Under 
this doctrine, officers can freely initiate conversations with anyone they 
encounter. During these conversations the police commonly inquire 
whether the person is armed.
52
 If the person chooses to answer and the 
answer is “yes,” officers have detected a weapon. If the answer is “no,” the 
officer may ask and obtain permission to do a quick “pat down” search. 
After all, the officers will say, if you are not armed, as you claim, why 
object to a pat down?
53
 No Fourth Amendment violation occurs in this 
scenario so long as a court rules that the subject of the encounter 
voluntarily agreed to stop, talk, and be frisked.
54
  
 
 
 50. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000); see also Stephanie Clifford, In Brooklyn Gun 
Cases, Suspicion Turns to the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at A26 (discussing series of 
suspicious cases where officers based arrests on a confidential informer’s tip that someone was 
armed). Often, the tip of gun possession is not anonymous. See, e.g., United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 
1170, 1171 (9th Cir. 2007) (“An employee of the local utility company, Arizona Public Service 
(“APS”), reported to mall personnel that he observed a man (later identified as Orman) place a 
handgun in his boot before entering the mall.”); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 352 (3d Cir. 
2000) (upholding subsequent stop where “a young black man in his early twenties flagged [police] 
down and explained that he had just seen a man with a gun”). 
 51. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“As long as the person to whom 
questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion 
upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and 
objective justification.”); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (same); Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (“[A] search authorized by consent is wholly valid.”). 
 52. See sources cited infra note 53. 
 53. See Mitchell v. United States, 233 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing that once 
suspect being questioned near the location of shots being fired “acknowledged that he had a weapon 
on him,” the officers “were not only entitled to investigate further, but also to ensure their safety in the 
process by removing the gun”); United States v. McKinnon, 133 F. App’x 167, 169 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(upholding gun seizure where officer patrolling housing project obtained pedestrian’s permission to do 
a pat down and found a gun); United States v. Williams, 215 F.3d 1323 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished 
table disposition) (upholding legality of officer’s discovery of gun by asking suspect, Lawrence 
Marcell Williams, if he could search him and, after suspect indicated acquiescence, finding gun in 
suspect’s jacket). 
 54. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434–35  (citations omitted) (“[E]ven when officers have no basis for 
suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine 
the individual’s identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage—as long as the police 
do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.”). 
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2. Coercive Encounters 
In most cases, people unlawfully carrying guns are discreet, foiling the 
direct gun-detection techniques described in the prior part. As a result, 
police interested in detecting and deterring public gun carrying must take 
more proactive measures. The most common techniques can be broken 
down by the legal doctrines that authorize them: pretextual arrests and 
Terry stop and frisks.
55
 
When police possess “probable cause” to suspect a criminal offense has 
been committed, they can constitutionally arrest the offender and perform 
a search incident to arrest.
56
 This rule applies regardless of the subjective 
intent of the officer or the seriousness of the offense.
57
 As a consequence, 
police who have probable cause to suspect even relatively minor offenses, 
such as traffic infractions, jaywalking, drug possession, or trespassing, can 
leverage the minor offense into a search of the person, even if the actual 
motivation for the search is a speculative hope of detecting unlawful gun 
possession. Taking advantage of this doctrine, officers regularly 
investigate and detect gun possession through searches legally justified by 
suspicion of common, sometimes trivial, offenses.
58
 Thus, New York City 
 
 
 55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968). 
 56. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“[W]arrantless arrests for crimes 
committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the Constitution, and . . . while 
States are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections.”); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (“If an officer 
has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in 
his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”); Arkansas v. 
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771 (2001). 
 57. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531, 541 
(6th Cir. 2008) (“[A] seizure for an ongoing violation of any crime—no matter how minor—is 
governed by the standard of reasonable suspicion . . . .”); Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions 
and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(2011) (critiquing the Supreme Court’s criminal procedure doctrine for failing to consider crime 
severity in the Fourth Amendment calculus). 
 58. See United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reporting testimony of 
officer that “the [Washington, D.C.,] police were performing an ‘aggressive traffic patrol’—looking 
‘for moving violations, tag violations, reasons to pull vehicles over’—because, as Officer Teixeira 
testified, ‘that’s normally how we get a lot of our narcotics and gun arrests,’” but emphasizing the 
irrelevance of the true motive for the traffic stop); I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and 
Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. 835, 869 (2008) (describing findings of the Mollen Commission that suggested 
the New York City police officers who believed a suspect might be carrying a gun would make up a 
pretextual reason for a stop and search, such as that “‘they saw a bulge in a person’s pocket’”); Eric 
Pooley & Elaine Rivera, One Good Apple, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54 (reporting on Maple’s desire to 
“go after shootings” and his suggestion that confronting people for minor violations like having an 
open beer or public urination can lead to frisks—“‘[m]aybe I bump against that bulge in your belt’”—
that uncover weapons). 
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police officers could arrest someone “they observed . . . riding his bicycle 
on the sidewalk,” a potential violation of the city’s Administrative Code; 
their discovery of an unlicensed firearm in the search that followed 
constituted “a lawful search incident to a proper seizure.”59 Similarly, 
Columbia, Missouri, police could arrest someone for trespassing and rely 
on a handgun found in the search incident to arrest to support a subsequent 
firearm charge.
60
 
Even when an officer does not possess probable cause to suspect an 
offense, the Fourth Amendment (as interpreted by the courts) permits a 
brief stop and cursory search based upon a lower level of suspicion. 
Specifically, under Terry v. Ohio, an officer may “conduct a brief, 
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that criminal activity is afoot.”61 A “frisk” may follow if there is 
reasonable suspicion to believe the person is armed and dangerous.
62
 
Again, there is no requirement that the suspected offense be violent or 
serious.
63
 As explained by the late Bill Stuntz, this means that “Terry’s 
requirements are easily met. Reasonable suspicion may mean little more 
than being a young man in a high-crime neighborhood on a street corner 
where drug deals are thought to happen.”64 The doctrine permits, for 
example, Tulsa police to stop a person based on “reasonable suspicion” 
that he was violating a city ordinance that prohibits “walk[ing] in the road 
when there is a sidewalk available for pedestrian use,” and rely on the gun 
found in the pat down that followed to support a later firearm 
prosecution.
65
  
Like pretextual arrests, Terry stops provide a viable mechanism for 
motivated police officers to seek out unlawful gun possession. 
 
 
 59. United States v. McFadden, 238 F.3d 198, 204 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding search as described 
above as a valid search incident to arrest). 
 60. United States v. Griffith, 533 F.3d 979, 985 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding search as described 
above); cf. BRATTON, supra note 27, at 154 (explaining an “unanticipated by-product” of fare-evader 
sweeps instituted under a “Broken Windows” paradigm in the New York subways was that stops for 
fare evasion uncovered unlawful weapons). 
 61. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (explaining that “[i]n Terry, we held that an 
officer may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” and that this is “a less demanding standard than probable 
cause”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 62. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 63. David Keenan & Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity Model for Stop-and-Frisks, 123 
YALE L.J. 1448, 1458 & n.60 (2014) (stating that “lower courts routinely uphold stop-and-frisks for 
even the most minor offenses so long as an officer can articulate a reasonable suspicion” and citing 
cases supporting this assertion). 
 64. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2170 (2002). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Birmingham, No. 13-CR-0237-CVE, 2014 WL 580138, at *4 
(N.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2014). 
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Presumably, this was the legal hook for Jack Maple’s daily, coercive gun 
stops based only on the sight of a suspicious bulge.
66
 Following Maple’s 
example, in the hundreds of thousands of stop-and-frisks documented by 
the NYPD, officers most often list “weapons possession” as the suspected 
crime.
67
 Taking full advantage of Terry’s applicability to all offenses, 
officers also frequently cited “trespassing” as a basis for gun-seeking 
stops.
68
 
3. Gun-Detecting Technology 
Gun-detecting technologies present an appealing alternative to 
intrusive and potentially discriminatory investigative techniques, such as 
pretextual arrests and “stop and frisks.” These technologies already exist 
and, as they mature, may allow police to scan crowds for firearms without 
the public outcry and (perhaps) constitutional obstacles occasioned by 
practices such as “stop and frisk.”69 
Portable weapons scanners head the list of technologies with the 
greatest potential for urban policing.
70
 The NYPD recently obtained a 
prototype scanner that can reveal concealed weapons by passively 
detecting background radiation differentials.
71
 While scanners in their 
 
 
 66. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 67. OFFICE OF MGMT. ANALYSIS AND PLANNING, NYPD, 2011 REASONABLE SUSPICION STOPS 4 
(2012) (25.6% of all stops); OFFICE OF MGMT. ANALYSIS AND PLANNING, NYPD, 2012 REASONABLE 
SUSPICION STOPS 4 (2013) (24.3% of all stops), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/ 
analysis_and_planning/reports.shtml. 
 68. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (analyzing an NYPD 
stop based on “criminal trespass”); Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2010, at A1 (describing NYPD’s heavy reliance on minor violations, particularly 
violations of rules governing public housing projects, to justify stops).  
 69. W.R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.2(b) (3d ed. West 2014) (“Recent 
developments in concealed weapons detection technology will likely produce a variety of equipment 
which police will soon have available to detect weapons on persons or in other locations.”); Vernick et 
al., supra note 26, at 567 (“Devices currently being developed and tested could permit the police to 
scan an individual from a distance—much as a hand-held radar gun enables the speed of a vehicle to 
be determined from a distance—to determine if a firearm is being carried under his or her clothing.”).  
 70. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 20, 1994, at 47, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/20/magazine/just-take-away-their-guns.html?page wanted 
=1 (“What is needed is a device that will enable the police to detect the presence of a large lump of 
metal in someone’s pocket from a distance of 10 or 15 feet.”). 
 71. Rocco Parascandola, NYPD Commissioner Says Department Will Begin Testing a New High-
Tech Device that Scans for Concealed Weapons, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2013, 10:27 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-readies-scan-and-frisk-article-1.1245663 (reporting that 
the NYPD “just received a machine that reads terahertz—the natural energy emitted by people and 
inanimate objects—and allows police to view concealed weapons from a distance” and explaining that 
the device “is small enough to be placed in a police vehicle”); Tamer El-Ghobashy, Police Tool 
Targets Guns, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2013, 9:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142 
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current iteration can be deployed in patrol cars, departments are working 
toward models that would be “small enough to carry on an officer’s gun 
belt.”72 As the technology improves, patrol officers could scan for guns 
from cars or while on foot in populated areas; authorities could also place 
scanners on fixed observation posts alongside proliferating surveillance 
cameras.
73
 Although their constitutionality has not been tested, these 
devices could potentially permit officers to detect firearm carriers without 
stopping (“seizing”) or frisking (“searching”) anyone. Like radar devices 
used to determine the speed of passing vehicles, the scans would often be 
conducted without the subjects ever knowing they had taken place. Other 
forms of “technology,” including dogs trained to sniff guns (or more 
precisely gun powder), can also be employed for the purpose of non-
intrusive gun detection.
74
 As the next Part chronicles, all of these methods 
of gun detection are called into question by the recent expansion of 
Second Amendment rights. 
II. SECOND AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO GUN POLICING 
Parallel American norms of a robust, rural gun culture and strict, urban 
gun control have coexisted uneasily for centuries.
75
 In recent years, the 
gun culture has gained the upper hand, methodically knocking down 
longstanding urban gun restrictions through legislative and judicial action. 
This Part illustrates these changes to substantive gun law and explores 
their Fourth Amendment implications.  
 
 
4127887323539804578260261579068182 (describing portable scanners being developed for NYPD 
and noting that “police aimed to get the T-Ray technology in a device small enough to carry on an 
officer’s gun belt”). 
 72. El-Ghobashy, supra note 71. 
 73. “[T]he New York City Police Department already has access to about 2,000 surveillance 
cameras on the island of Manhattan alone.” Ken Hanly, New York City Police Eye Drones for 
Surveillance Purposes, DIGITAL J. (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/ 341541, 
archived at http://perma.cc/35WP-ZHL4. 
 74. Danielle E. Gaines, County Police Introduce Gun-Sniffing Dogs, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 
2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/county-police-introduce-gun-sniffing-dogs/2011/11/21/ 
gIQAL9ZKoN_story.html (discussing Montgomery County Police Department’s “firearm-detecting 
dogs”). 
 75. Blocher, supra note 10, at 90–103 (describing “two cultures”); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 
F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting historical and scholarly sources demonstrating “the long 
history of concealed carry restrictions in this country”); NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven before the Revolution, gun use 
and gun control have been inextricably intertwined.”). 
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A. Handgun Regulation Under Siege 
The substantive laws undergirding urban gun policing are being 
hollowed out on two fronts. First, courts are scrutinizing gun regulations 
with renewed vigor after District of Columbia v. Heller. Second, state 
legislatures are preempting municipal gun regulations, requiring cities to 
allow public firearm possession irrespective of court intervention. The 
upshot of both of these changes, sometimes operating in tandem, is a 
steady trend of loosening gun restrictions.  
1. Legislative Easing of Gun Regulation 
State legislatures steadily eased gun restrictions over the past decade. 
In June 2002, seven states and the District of Columbia prohibited the 
concealed carrying of handguns.
76
 Today, no such bans remain.
77
 While 
American cities continue to restrict firearm carrying through licensing 
requirements, these licensing regimes are also under siege. States are 
steadily migrating from “no-issue” (i.e., no concealed carry permits) to 
“may-issue” (i.e., permits issued at the discretion of a police chief); from 
“may-issue” to “shall-issue” (i.e., permits must be issued to any qualified 
applicant); and from “shall-issue” to not requiring a permit at all.78 
Between 2002 and 2012, the number of “shall issue” states climbed from 
twenty-nine to thirty-nine, and the number of states where permits are 
unnecessary to carry a concealed firearm quadrupled from one to four.
79
 
The steady erosion of gun regulations impacts even cities whose 
citizens favor strict gun control. State law trumps municipal ordinances, 
and consequently state lawmakers can easily override local gun control 
preferences.
80
 Philadelphia regularly tries to impose gun restrictions 
analogous to those of other American cities. The Pennsylvania courts 
 
 
 76. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 tbl.1, 9 fig.1 (Illinois, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Mexico, Ohio, and Wisconsin). 
 77. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 78. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 tbl.1; Yourish et al., supra note 3. 
 79. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8 tbl.1 (noting three fewer states in the “shall-issue” chart 
due to move to no permit required); see also Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 441 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (cataloguing state gun laws). 
 80. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 713 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“as many as 41 States may pre-empt local gun regulation”); Blocher, supra note 10, at 100, 133 
(noting that “most states preempt some or all local gun control” and describing “dramatic change” in 
the past three decades of preemption of local gun control autonomy); Matt Valentine, Disarmed: How 
Cities Are Losing the Power to Regulate Guns, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2014/03/disarmed-how-cities-are-losing-the-power-to-regulate-guns/284220/ (describing 
the NRA’s successful, nationwide effort to push states to preempt local gun control laws). 
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express empathy, but consistently strike down the restrictions: “[w]hile we 
understand the terrible problems gun violence poses for the city and 
sympathize with its efforts to use its police powers to create a safe 
environment for its citizens, these practical considerations do not alter the 
clear preemption imposed by the [Pennsylvania] legislature . . . .”81 This 
pattern plays out in cities across the country, with recent examples from 
Atlanta,
82
 Cleveland,
83
 Phoenix,
84
 and San Francisco.
85
 
2. Judicial Invalidation of Gun Restrictions 
Municipalities located in states where legislatures continue to favor 
strict gun laws face challenges from the judiciary. While the constitutional 
validity of restrictive urban licensing regimes remained unquestioned for 
most of American history, this changed in 2008, when the Supreme Court 
held in Heller that “the [District of Columbia]’s ban on handgun 
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment.”86 Although 
Heller limited its precise holding to the Capitol’s ban on in-home guns, the 
Court’s recognition of an individual right to handgun possession for self-
 
 
 81. Clarke v. House of Representatives, 957 A.2d 361, 365 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008); see also 
Ortiz v. Pennsylvania, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. 1996) (“The constitution does not provide that the right 
to bear arms shall not be questioned in any part of the commonwealth except Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh, where it may be abridged at will, but that it shall not be questioned in any part of the 
commonwealth.”). 
 82. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. City of Roswell, 680 S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) 
(noting success of gun-rights group in trial court in suit against Atlanta and other Georgia cities to 
prevent them “from enforcing local ordinances that prohibited carrying firearms in city parks” as 
preempted, in resolving appeal of other issues in the case); Rachel Stockman, Gun Rights Group 
Targets Atlanta Gun Ordinance, WSB-TV (Jan. 17, 2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.wsbtv. com/news/ 
news/local/gun-rights-group-targets-atlanta-gun-ordinance/nTzHm/ (reporting on GeorgiaCarry’s 
threat to sue “Atlanta over a local ordinance which bans weapons at ‘public assemblies’ like festivals 
and parades” and noting that the group had “previously sued the city and won over a local ordinance 
banning guns at local parks”). 
 83. City of Cleveland v. State, 942 N.E.2d 370, 373 (Ohio 2010) (upholding constitutionality of 
provision against challenge by Cleveland); Bob Driehaus, Ohio Court Limits Power of Localities on 
Gun Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2010, at A15 (quoting Cleveland official warning that “gun owners 
would now be able to walk through a public square with rifles, handguns and assault weapons”). 
 84. See H.R. 2455, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) (amending Arizona lost property law, 
which requires property to be sold back to the public, to include “surrendered” property); Mary Jo 
Pitzl, New Arizona Gun Law Draws Outcry From Democrats, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Apr. 30, 2013, 10:49 
PM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130430arizona-new-gun-law-draws-democrats-
outcry.html?nclick_check=1 (reporting on Phoenix Police Department’s scramble to salvage gun buy-
back program after Arizona legislature mandated that guns had to be sold back to the public). 
 85. Fiscal v. City of San Francisco, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 335 (Ct. App. 2008) (invalidating San 
Francisco voter initiative to ban handgun possession ordinance preempted by state law). 
 86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).  
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defense
87
 signaled open season on gun restrictions outside the home. After 
all, the need for self-defense extends beyond the front door, particularly 
for city dwellers.
88
 Furthermore, handguns, rather than rifles or other long 
guns, are well suited to mobile protection. Following this reasoning, the 
Seventh Circuit ruled in 2012 that Heller required the invalidation of 
Illinois’ complete prohibition of public gun carrying.89 A federal judge in 
Washington, D.C., adopted the same argument in 2014, striking down the 
Capitol’s ban on handguns in public.90  
The legal battle over the broader implications of Heller is ongoing, 
with the opinion itself providing ammunition for both sides in the debate.
91
 
The Heller Court recognized that “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by 
the Second Amendment is not unlimited”92 and that “the majority of the 
19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on 
carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or 
state analogues.”93 Picking up on these cues, the Second Circuit in 
Kachalsky v. County of Westchester rejected a post-Heller challenge to 
New York’s restriction of concealed carry licenses to individuals 
demonstrating “proper cause.”94 The court concluded that New York’s 
limits implicate the Second Amendment, but nonetheless survive 
constitutional scrutiny because “[r]estricting handgun possession in public 
to those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a lawful purpose is 
substantially related to New York’s interests in public safety and crime 
 
 
 87. Id. at 628 (“[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment 
right.”).  
 88. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a Second 
Amendment right to carry a gun for self-defense logically extends beyond the home). 
 89. Id. at 942 (citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit noted that “Illinois is the only state that 
maintains a flat ban on carrying ready-to-use guns outside the home.” Id. at 940; cf. People v. Aguilar, 
2 N.E.3d 321, 327 (Ill. 2013) (“[I]f Heller means what it says, and ‘individual self-defense’ is indeed 
‘the central component’ of the second amendment right to keep and bear arms, then it would make 
little sense to restrict that right to the home.”). 
 90. Ruling on Summary Judgment at 3–4, 15, Palmer v. District of Columbia, No. 1:09-cv-
01482-FJS (D.D.C. July 2014) (describing D.C. framework prohibiting public handgun possession and 
noting that “[t]he District of Columbia appears to be the only jurisdiction that still has such a complete 
ban on the carrying of ready-to-use handguns outside the home”); Moore, 702 F.3d at 940 (recognizing 
the District of Columbia as the sole remaining jurisdiction with a handgun carry prohibition analogous 
to the one the court subsequently struck down). 
 91. Cf. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (“It remains unsettled whether the 
individual right to bear arms for the purpose of self-defense extends beyond the home.”); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 860–61, 887 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that arguments 
against gun restrictions “are much less compelling when applied outside the home” and noting that 
“[t]he historical case for regulation is likewise stronger outside the home”). 
 92. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 93. Id.; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (reiterating these “assurances”) (plurality opinion). 
 94. 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012); see supra Part I.A (discussing “proper cause” standard). 
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prevention.”95 The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 2013, 
rejecting a challenge to New Jersey’s analogous “justifiable need” 
requirement for obtaining a concealed carry license.
96
 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in 
Peruta v. County of San Diego, where frustrated applicants challenged San 
Diego’s implementation of California’s requirement that citizens show 
“good cause” to obtain a concealed carry license.97 The Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that state law prohibited open carrying of handguns, leaving 
concealed carry as the only option for citizens seeking to carry handguns 
in public.
98
 Yet the “good cause” requirement, as interpreted by San Diego 
(and other California cities), made concealed carry permits unavailable to 
San Diegans with only a generic desire for self-defense. The court 
analogized this near-total infringement on these citizens’ right to “bear” 
arms to the near-total infringement on the right to “keep” arms invalidated 
in Heller, and thus struck down San Diego’s licensing regime.99 The Ninth 
Circuit acknowledged the tradition of concealed carry prohibitions, but 
situated that prohibition in a historical context of widespread open firearm 
possession.
100
 The post-Heller Second Amendment may not require open 
carry or concealed carry, the Ninth Circuit explained, but it “does require 
that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside the 
home.”101 
While the Supreme Court showed initial interest in resolving the 
Circuit split described above (distributing the New Jersey case three times 
for discussion at its conference before finally denying certiorari), it 
ultimately declined to intervene, suggesting that a resolution may be 
 
 
 95. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 98. 
 96. Filko, 724 F.3d at 433, 440 (noting that New Jersey presents a “close analogue” to “New 
York’s permit schema” and concluding that “even if the ‘justifiable need’ standard” burdens the 
Second Amendment, “it nonetheless withstands intermediate scrutiny and is therefore constitutional”). 
 97. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 98. Id. at 1171 (explaining that California’s gun regulatory “scheme as a whole violates the 
Second Amendment because it precludes a responsible, law-abiding citizen from carrying a weapon in 
public for the purpose of lawful self-defense in any manner”). 
 99. Id. at 1170, 1172 (noting that “Heller teaches that a near-total prohibition on keeping arms 
(Heller) is hardly better than a near-total prohibition on bearing them (this case)” and consequently 
“the Second Amendment does require that the states permit some form of carry for self-defense outside 
the home”); cf. Baker v. Kealoha, 564 F. App’x 903, 904–05 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Peruta to 
Hawaii’s licensing scheme). 
 100. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1171–72. 
 101. Id. at 1172. During the final editing phases of this Article, the Ninth Circuit agreed to 
reconsider the Peruta decision en banc. See 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015). Whatever the results of the 
reconsideration, the underlying constitutional question must inevitably be answered by the Supreme 
Court. 
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delayed for years.
102
 When the Court finally does take up the question, it 
will undoubtedly stretch Heller beyond the home. Indeed, Justice Alito’s 
2010 opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago
103
 extending Heller to the 
states to strike down Chicago’s (home) handgun ban reads like a 
springboard designed to propel Heller outdoors. The opinion stresses that 
“in Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ 
of the Second Amendment right,” and repeatedly describes the right as one 
of self-defense generally without language restricting it to the home.
104
 
The next opinion virtually writes itself. If the Second Amendment right to 
“keep” arms requires states to allow law-abiding citizens to possess 
firearms in the home, the right to “bear” arms would seem to require states 
to allow analogous firearm possession outside the home. Some licensing 
will survive, but licensing regimes like those in New York City, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles, where ordinary law-abiding residents cannot 
obtain a permit to carry a handgun in public, are in serious constitutional 
jeopardy. Absent an abrupt change of course at the Supreme Court, the 
future is clear. More and more Americans will be able to lawfully carry 
handguns on city streets, and this pattern will play out in cities across the 
country, regardless of whether a majority of the city’s residents and 
officials favor strict gun control. The next parts analyze the Fourth 
Amendment implications of these developments for American policing. 
B. Transforming Gun-Detector Scans into “Searches” 
One of the least recognized, but perhaps most significant, effects of 
expanding gun rights is its impact on the constitutionality of gun-detecting 
technology. An expansive recognition of concealed carry rights may turn 
passive gun detection into a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. This 
counterintuitive implication derives from Supreme Court jurisprudence 
that holds that citizens enjoy no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
“contraband.”105 As guns detected in public spaces become less likely to 
constitute “contraband,” courts will be unable to shrug off their detection 
in any jurisdiction as constitutional non-searches. 
 
 
 102. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); see 
also Drake v. Jerejian, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/drake-v-jerejian/ 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (noting distribution for conference three separate times before the petition 
was denied). 
 103. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 104. Id. at 767, 780. 
 105. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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As discussed in Part I, police departments are seeking to develop viable 
passive-detection technologies that reveal the presence of concealed 
firearms, without the personal intrusion and dangers of a physical search. 
The constitutionality of suspicion-less weapons scans turns on whether 
such a scan constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.106 This 
question, in turn, depends on whether a person walking on a public street 
has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the information that a gun 
scan would reveal.
107
 Supreme Court case law currently offers no answer 
to this question. The strongest guidance comes from United States v. 
Place.
108
 In Place, the Supreme Court ruled that a narcotics dog’s sniff of 
a suspect’s luggage was not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and 
thus need not be preceded by individualized suspicion.
109
 The Court 
emphasized characteristics of the sniff that also apply to gun detectors. As 
opposed to a “typical search,” a dog sniff is “less intrusive” because it 
“does not require opening the luggage” and does not expose 
“noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public 
view.”110 Perhaps the most promising language from Place for the 
constitutionality of gun detectors is the following: “[t]his limited 
disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to 
the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and 
more intrusive investigative methods.”111 The holding and the reasoning of 
Place thus resonate with the notion that relatively unobtrusive gun-
detecting technology could replace more intrusive tactics (e.g., stop and 
frisks, pretextual arrests, consent searches) as a constitutional mechanism 
for detecting and deterring unlawful gun possession on city streets. 
The analogy to Place is imperfect, however. Place emphasizes that a 
drug dog’s sniff can only detect narcotics, a form of “contraband.” Later, 
in Illinois v. Caballes, the Supreme Court honed in on this aspect of the 
case, explaining that sniffs were not searches because “any interest in 
possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate’”; thus, 
“governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 
 
 
 106. Gun detectors will be most effective if they can be deployed without individualized suspicion 
that each person scanned possesses a firearm (i.e., “suspicion-less” scans). As a consequence, absent 
special doctrinal treatment, their constitutionality will hinge on whether scans constitute a “search.” 
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or seizure is ordinarily 
unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”). If a scan is not a “search” or 
“seizure,” the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by its use. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 107. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 108. 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”112 Finding common ground 
with Place, Caballes distinguished the competing case of Kyllo v. United 
States
113
 by stating that “[c]ritical to that decision [Kyllo] was the fact that 
the [technology at issue] was capable of detecting lawful activity.”114 
The central analytical component of Place and the cases that follow it, 
then, is the likelihood that items detected by police will be contraband. 
When cities like Chicago, the District of Columbia, San Francisco, and 
New York effectively outlawed handgun carrying, concealed guns 
detected by scanners could fairly be labeled “contraband.” The analysis 
changes, however, as courts and legislators compel these cities to 
implement permissive licensing regimes. Even assuming passive gun 
scanners, like drug-sniffing dogs, could be configured to reveal only the 
presence of handguns, this output is no longer invariably contraband. With 
a constitutional right to public gun possession on the horizon and steadily 
easing statutory restrictions, courts will be unable to ignore the increasing 
likelihood that guns detected—whether in rural Montana or downtown Los 
Angeles—are lawfully carried. Consequently, gun detectors deployed on 
city streets will increasingly detect not just “contraband” (unlicensed 
handguns) but also “noncontraband items,” such as lawfully carried guns 
“that otherwise would remain hidden from public view.’”115 The 
transforming gun-rights landscape thus makes it increasingly unlikely that 
cities can invoke the Place line of cases to argue that suspicion-less gun 
 
 
 112. 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). 
 113. 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001) (holding that the application of “sense-enhancing technology,” if 
“not in general public use,” to obtain “information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’” 
constitutes a “search”).  
 114. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10 (“The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly 
lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or 
expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.”); see also United 
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123–24 (1984) (“[G]overnmental conduct that can reveal whether a 
substance is cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest. 
. . . Here, as in Place, the likelihood that official conduct . . . will actually compromise any legitimate 
interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment.”); cf. David A. Harris, Superman’s X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New 
Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (1996) (recognizing the seemingly “strong 
analogy between [gun-detecting] devices and the reasoning of Place and Jacobsen,” but arguing that 
those cases are “wrongheaded[]” and should not be followed); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth 
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (1983) (“[I]f a 
device could be invented that accurately detected weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of 
people, there could be no fourth amendment objection to its use.”). 
 115. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)). 
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detection is lawful because it is not a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.
116
 
If expanding gun rights make it impossible to characterize suspicion-
less gun detection as a constitutional “non-search,” cities will seek out 
other doctrinal theories to preserve the promise of gun detectors. One 
likely argument will be that even though gun detection is a “search,” it is 
reasonable even when not supported by a warrant and individualized 
suspicion under the “special needs” doctrine. Anticipating this argument, 
David Harris forcefully argues that gun scans do not qualify as “special 
needs” searches because scanners serve no “special need of the 
government, beyond the detection and prevention of crime.”117 Harris’s 
observation that “[g]un detectors serve no non-criminal purpose: . . . they 
have nothing to do with regulated industries,” may hint at the key to a 
viable “special needs” argument.118 If a city can tie gun detection to its 
enforcement of a comprehensive concealed carry regulatory regime, courts 
may find suspicion-less, urban gun detection constitutional.
119
 (Of course, 
as discussed in Part III, the regulatory regime itself must survive Second 
Amendment scrutiny). Thus, “special needs” may still hold some promise 
as a constitutional grounding for urban gun-detecting technology.  
Nevertheless, as discussed in the next Part, a court ruling deeming 
suspicion-less gun detection constitutional (a notable result in itself) will 
only be a partial success for urban policymakers seeking to preserve 
traditional gun policing. The changing gun-rights landscape reduces the 
ability of police to act on a gun detection “hit” (i.e., information that 
someone is carrying a concealed firearm), no matter how that information 
is obtained. 
 
 
 116. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH & SEIZURE § 2.2(d) (5th ed. 2015) (asserting that a “no-search 
characterization” following the reasoning in Place “will be possible as to gun detection devices in only 
about half of the states” and highlighting the “irony that at precisely the time when these weapons 
detection devices are being perfected, more and more states have adopted laws under which large 
numbers of citizens can lawfully carry concealed weapons”); Harris, supra note 114, at 58 (noting that 
the increasing prevalence of lawful gun carrying would render the conclusion that gun detectors only 
detect “contraband” “questionable at best”). A scanner could potentially be configured to detect both a 
firearm and a license, and to only indicate a “hit” when it detects the firearm, but no license. In that 
case, technology might be able to fit within the Place-Caballes framework of only detecting 
contraband (i.e., unlawfully carried weapons). 
 117. Harris, supra note 114, at 28.  
 118. Id. 
 119. Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (ruling that state hospital’s drug 
tests violated the Fourth Amendment because the “primary purpose” hinged on the use of “the threat 
of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into [drug] treatment,” and consequently fell outside 
“the closely guarded category of ‘special needs’”).  
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C. Decreasing the Relevance of Guns to “Reasonable Suspicion” 
Perhaps the most immediate impact of expanding gun rights on 
policing tactics is legal uncertainty regarding what police can do when 
they observe, or learn of, a person carrying a firearm. Traditionally, courts 
(and police) assumed that officers could stop and question someone they 
observed with a concealed handgun, at least in jurisdictions with strict 
regulation of concealed weapon carrying.
120
 Judges’ (and officers’) 
comfort with this scenario rested on a generally unstated empirical 
assumption that there was a significant likelihood that such a person was 
carrying the gun unlawfully.
121
 In fact, one of the most famous arrests in 
American history, the fortuitous arrest of Timothy McVeigh by an 
Oklahoma State Trooper, follows this pattern.
122
 The trooper arrested 
McVeigh for unlawful handgun possession after observing a bulge in 
McVeigh’s jacket, unaware that McVeigh was fleeing from perpetrating 
one of the most horrific bombings in American history.
123
 Although 
McVeigh’s defense team litigated many aspects of the case, it conceded 
that his possession of a handgun constituted “probable cause” for his 
arrest.
124
 As this Part explains, increasingly permissive gun-possession 
laws erode the assumption that public handgun possession is unlawful. 
Consequently, the Fourth Amendment authority flowing from that 
assumption must be reevaluated.
125
 
 
 
 120. See discussion infra Part II.C; see also United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App’x 117, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (explaining that “Pennsylvania courts have consistently held an officer’s observance of an 
individual’s possession of a firearm in a public place in Philadelphia is sufficient to create reasonable 
suspicion to detain that individual for further investigation” and collecting supporting cases); MAPLE, 
supra note 46, at 42 (discussing coercive action taken upon detection of a suspicious bulge in a 
citizen’s pockets); sources cited supra note 67 (listing “weapons possession” as a primary basis for 
Terry stops). 
 121. See discussion infra Part II.C. 
 122. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1178 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Hanger arrested McVeigh 
upon discovering that he was carrying a concealed, loaded gun.”); United States v. McVeigh, 940 F. 
Supp. 1541, 1546 (D. Colo. 1996). 
 123. While McVeigh was in custody for unlawful possession of a firearm, authorities 
independently determined that he was responsible for the deaths of 168 people in the 1995 bombing of 
a federal building in Oklahoma City. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. at 1546. 
 124. Id. at 1556. The trooper testified that while McVeigh was “very calm, polite” during a traffic 
stop, the trooper noticed a “bulge under his left arm”; after McVeigh said he had a gun, the trooper 
“grabbed for the bulge,” “removed [his] pistol from [his] holster and stuck it to the back of 
[McVeigh’s] head.” Testimony of Oklahoma State Trooper Hanger, supra note 48. 
 125. Indeed, soon after McVeigh’s arrest, Oklahoma enacted laws that would have made 
McVeigh’s handgun possession lawful if, as reports suggest, he had a valid out-of-state permit. See 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1290.3 (1996) (authorizing licensing of concealed weapons); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
21, § 1290.26 (1996) (recognizing “any valid concealed or unconcealed carry weapons permit or 
license issued by another state”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1289.13 (1996) (prohibiting transportation of 
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Fourth Amendment doctrine centers on probabilities.
126
 An officer may 
well be wrong about whether someone seized or searched was engaged in 
wrongdoing. But the test for a constitutional violation focuses solely on 
what the officer knew ex ante, at the time she initiated the challenged 
action.
127
 As first set out in Terry v. Ohio, the minimum ex ante 
probability level for a stop or search is “reasonable suspicion.”128 
Although courts are reluctant to quantify the probability represented by 
this label, we know that the “reasonable suspicion” standard is low: 
“‘considerably less than proof . . . by a preponderance of the evidence,’ 
and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause.”129 
“[R]easonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent 
conduct.’”130  
Despite this low standard, courts will be hard-pressed to accept, as 
constituting “reasonable suspicion” of a crime, an observation of an 
increasingly common activity that is not only lawful, but specifically 
protected by the Second Amendment. The post-Heller argument that a 
person’s possession of a firearm cannot alone constitute reasonable 
suspicion to justify a stop is simply stated. In the words of a Florida court:  
Despite the obvious potential danger to officers and the public by a 
person in possession of a concealed gun in a crowd, this is not 
illegal in Florida unless the person does not have a concealed 
weapons permit, a fact that an officer cannot glean by mere 
observation. . . . [S]topping a person solely on the ground that the 
individual possesses a gun violates the Fourth Amendment.
131
 
 
 
loaded handgun except if transporting party is licensed); Harris, supra note 114, at 57 (noting that “[i]f 
many thousands of people can legally carry concealed firearms, detecting a gun on a person does not 
tell a police officer enough” to support an arrest and “[a]rguably it may not raise even a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity”). 
 126. See Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance of Justification 
Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514, 1555 (2010) (“Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure law . . . has 
always treated probable cause as the princip[al] tool for balancing privacy and security.”); Sherry F. 
Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus Concrete Harms, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 71 (2010) (discussing probability conundrums inherent in permitting officers to 
arrest based on “probable cause”). 
 127. See Schubert v. City of Springfield, 589 F.3d 496, 502 (1st Cir. 2009) (“It is clear in this case 
that, in hindsight, Schubert in fact posed no threat to public safety. However, on these facts, Officer 
Stern certainly had reasonable suspicion to stop the unknown armed man in order to ascertain his 
identity, his authority to possess the gun, and his intentions.”). 
 128. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (summarizing Terry). 
 129. Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 
 130. Id. at 1690–91 (setting out contours of reasonable suspicion standard). 
 131. Regalado v. State, 25 So.3d 600, 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (invalidating a stop after a 
civilian informed a police officer that a nearby person had a handgun in his waistband; the person was 
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The federal courts have largely declined to follow the Florida court’s 
reasoning. While the Supreme Court has not directly spoken on the 
question, it suggested in the pre-Heller case of Adams v. Williams that 
possession of a concealed handgun constitutes at least “reasonable 
suspicion” to support a search or seizure.132 In Adams, the Court held that 
once an officer found the suspect in possession of a gun, “probable cause 
existed to arrest [him] for unlawful possession of the weapon”—even 
though the arrest took place in a jurisdiction that allowed gun possession 
with a permit.
133
 The question arose again in Florida v. J.L., where the 
Court ruled that an anonymous tip that an individual waiting at a bus stop 
“was carrying a gun” was not sufficient to support a stop.134 Although the 
Court based its ruling entirely on the unreliability of the tip, the discussion 
at oral argument revolved around the broader question of whether even a 
reliable tip that someone possessed a concealed handgun could support a 
stop.
135
 During the discussion, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that the 
Court had already decided this question in Adams where, while 
recognizing that in “Connecticut you could carry with a permit,” the Court 
“said that a frisk was nonetheless justified.”136 
 
 
stopped at gunpoint and arrested for carrying a concealed handgun without a permit); see also St. John 
v. McColley, 653 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1161 (D.N.M. 2009) (“Mr. St. John’s lawful possession of a 
loaded firearm in a crowded place could not, by itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to 
justify an investigatory detention.”); State v. Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 480–81 (Tenn. 2012) 
(rejecting argument that knowledge of a concealed weapon justified a Terry stop because “one’s status 
as an ‘armed party’ is not per se illegal”); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 692 A.2d 1068, 1071 (Pa. 
1997) (ridiculing the government’s “radical” position that police can “stop and frisk when they receive 
information from any source that a suspect has a gun” because “it is not illegal to carry a licensed gun 
in Pennsylvania”). 
 132. 407 U.S. 143, 148–49 (1972). 
 133. Id. The majority explained that “the policeman found Williams in possession of a gun in 
precisely the place predicted by the informant [and that] tended to corroborate the reliability of the 
informant’s further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding circumstances, certainly 
suggested no lawful explanation for possession of the gun.” Id. The dissenters pointed out that 
“‘Connecticut allows its citizens to carry weapons, concealed or otherwise, at will, provided only they 
have a permit, and gives its police officers no special authority to stop for the purpose of determining 
whether the citizen has one.’” Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Williams 
v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38–39 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting)); see also id. at 149–50 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Can it be said that a man in possession of narcotics will not have a permit 
for his gun?”). 
 134. 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). 
 135. The issue came up repeatedly in oral argument, with the Justices emphasizing at points that 
while concealed carry was lawful in Florida, it was not lawful for a minor such as J.L. Transcript of 
Oral Argument, J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (No. 98-1993), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-
1999/1999/1999_98_1993 (last visited Apr. 13, 2015); J.L., 529 U.S. at 269 (noting J.L.’s age and that 
he was convicted of possessing a concealed weapon without a license while under the age of 18). 
 136. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 135. The attorney for the United States took a 
narrower view, emphasizing that “it is critical . . . that there be reasonable suspicion that the person 
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The view that concealed handgun possession constitutes reasonable 
suspicion for a Terry stop finds broad support in the lower federal courts. 
For example, in Schubert v. City of Springfield, the First Circuit rejected a 
lawsuit challenging an officer’s Terry stop of an attorney carrying a 
handgun under his suit jacket.
137
 The court explained that “the officer 
observed Schubert walking toward the Springfield courthouse carrying a 
gun” and warned that it “need not outline in detail the obvious and 
potentially horrific events that could have transpired had an officer noted a 
man walking toward the courthouse with a gun and chosen not to 
intervene.”138 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit upheld a Terry stop based, in 
large part, on indicia that “suggested [the suspect] might be carrying a 
gun,” and echoed the Supreme Court in Adams by stating that after a frisk 
“revealed [a] gun,” the “officers had probable cause to arrest” for carrying 
a handgun (without a permit).
139
 The Eleventh Circuit recently ruled that a 
person’s “admission that he was carrying a handgun in his waistband” 
constituted “reasonable suspicion to believe that [he] was committing a 
crime under Florida law—carrying a concealed weapon.”140 As it turns 
out, the person, like the attorney in Schubert, had a valid concealed carry 
permit.
141
 The court emphasized that “reasonable suspicion analysis is not 
concerned with ‘hard certainties, but with probabilities,’”142 and the 
possibility of unlawful possession of the weapon “was sufficient to justify 
 
 
does not have a license, and that’s furnished in this case by the fact that there’s reasonable suspicion 
that he’s under 21.” Id.  
 137. 589 F.3d 496, 502 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 138. Id. at 501–02 (upholding investigatory stop where “the officer saw a man [a prominent 
defense attorney] carrying a gun in a high-crime area, walking toward an important public building 
[the Springfield courthouse]”). 
 139. United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 807–08 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 140. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 141. Id. See also United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 2013) (relying on 
similar reasoning to uphold stop of person when officer observed firearm in his pants: “most assuredly, 
the Government need not negate these exceptions to N.M. Stat. Ann § 30–7–2(A) to establish the 
crime of ‘carrying a concealed loaded firearm . . . anywhere’ in New Mexico”); United States v. Bold, 
19 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that “the overwhelming majority of the people in New 
York State and City are not licensed to carry handguns,” “the limited ability of the officers to confirm 
all of the anonymous tip information, the report that the occupants of the car possessed a gun, and the 
statistical likelihood that the gun was illegal” in upholding Terry stop of car); United States v. King, 
990 F.2d 1552, 1561 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Officer LeMasters’ observation of an apparently loaded pistol 
. . . would justify her separation of Defendants from the pistol in order to ensure her own safety during 
the encounter.”); State v. Taylor, No. 92382, 2009 WL 3647052, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2009) 
(upholding stop where officer observed gun concealed on person based on suspicion that the person 
did not have a license). 
 142. Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1304 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
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briefly stopping him before inquiring” about whether he had “a valid 
concealed-weapons permit.”143  
Reacting to the perceived prevalence of gun stops, recent pro-gun laws 
include provisions that limit police investigative authority. For example, a 
provision added to Georgia’s gun laws by the “Safe Carry Protection Act,” 
and mirrored in other states, provides that “[a] person carrying a weapon 
shall not be subject to detention for the sole purpose of investigating 
whether such person has a weapons carry license.”144 Other state laws say 
the opposite. New Jersey law states that when the lawfulness of a person’s 
gun possession “depends on his possession of a license or permit . . . , it 
shall be presumed that he does not possess such a license or permit . . . 
until he establishes the contrary.”145 Importantly, these provisions express 
only state law preferences and cannot change the Fourth Amendment 
calculus.
146
 
 
 
 143. Id. Another line of federal cases upholds gun stops on the (spurious) ground that “the 
possession of a valid permit for a concealed weapon is not related to the elements of the crime, but 
rather is an affirmative defense.” Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1304 (citing FLA. STAT. § 790.01(2-3)); United 
States v. Gatlin, 613 F.3d 374, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Delaware case law regarding the burden 
of proof for unlicensed possession charge at trial); United States v. Cooper, 293 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (rejecting challenge to stop based on officer’s observation of a handgun in suspect’s 
waistband because “licensure is an affirmative defense” under Pennsylvania law); GeorgiaCarry.Org, 
Inc. v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., No. 1:09-CV-594-TWT, 2009 WL 5033444, at *5 (N.D. 
Ga. Dec. 14, 2009) (“Because a Georgia firearms license is an affirmative defense to . . . the crime of 
carrying a concealed weapon, it does not matter if there was no reason to suspect that Raissi did not 
have a Georgia firearms license.”). But see United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(holding that “a mere allegation that a suspect possesses a firearm” does not “justify an officer in 
stopping a suspect absent the reasonable suspicion required by Terry”). The licensing statutes do not 
support the conclusion that a license is an “affirmative defense,” but even if they did, states cannot so 
easily avoid the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See infra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. 
The licensing statutes, in fact, mirror driver’s license regulations; but no one suggests that possessing a 
driver’s license is an affirmative defense to the offense of driving without a license. See infra note 188 
and accompanying text. 
 144. GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-11-137(b) (2015); see also ALA. CODE § 13A-11-7(c) (2014) (enacting 
“rebuttable presumption that the mere carrying of a visible pistol, holstered or secured, in a public 
place, in and of itself, is not” unlawful). 
 145. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-2(b) (2014); see also United States v. Horne, 386 F. App’x 313, 
315 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“Taken at face value . . . the presumption would dictate that 
when police in New Jersey reasonably suspect that a person is carrying a firearm, they also have 
reasonable suspicion that he is committing a crime unless the circumstances affirmatively suggest he 
has a permit.”); United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting potential 
applicability of this aspect of “New Jersey’s regulatory scheme” in assessing legality of Terry stop for 
gun possession, but declining to assess its impact in light of alternative grounds for upholding stop).  
 146. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176, 178 (2008) (explaining that “state restrictions do 
not alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections” and, consequently, whatever state law says on the 
question, “[w]hen officers have probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime in their 
presence, the Fourth Amendment permits them to make an arrest”).  
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With respect to the Fourth Amendment, police officers’ authority to 
stop an armed person depends on the constitutional standard
147
 —whether 
there is “reasonable suspicion” to suspect that the person is committing an 
offense (e.g., unlicensed firearm possession). Officers in Georgia may be 
prohibited by the United States Constitution from stopping an armed 
person to find out if the person has a license; and officers in New Jersey 
may be permitted to conduct such a stop. But the question will be resolved 
without reference to local statutory provisions that purport to limit or 
expand officer authority.
148
 The permissibility of a stop under the Fourth 
Amendment depends on the ex ante probability that the suspect is breaking 
the law. As explained above, that probability, when based on suspected 
gun carrying, depends on the strictness of the jurisdiction’s handgun 
licensing laws and the prevalence of licensees. Given the changes in 
substantive law described in Part II.A, these variables will increasingly 
lead to the conclusion that stops justified only by an officer’s observation 
of a gun are unconstitutional. 
D. Preventing Officers from Temporarily Disarming Gun Carriers 
Expanding gun rights also restrict the actions police can take when 
interacting with armed citizens. The widespread assumption in urban areas 
that armed people can be, at least temporarily, disarmed during police 
encounters may no longer hold sway in a post-Heller world.
149
 Indeed, 
expanding gun rights may mean that officers must ignore the guns they 
come across and learn to interact on equal footing with their fellow arms-
bearing citizens. 
Although often overlooked, Terry authorizes two distinct actions, a 
“stop” and a “frisk,” each controlled by a separate test. Police can stop 
persons who appear to be engaged in crime. They can frisk if there is 
reasonable suspicion to believe the person “is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others.”150 Weapons seizures are not an 
explicit part of the Terry framework, but a necessary implication of the 
 
 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.; cf. Robert Leider, May I See Your License? Terry Stops and License Verification, 31 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 387, 424–25 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he element/defense distinction has no 
relevance for Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence” because “[r]egardless of whether 
the legislature classifies the licensing issue as an element or a defense, the statute permits and prohibits 
exactly the same conduct”). 
 149. See supra Part II.C. 
 150. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 27 (1968) (noting that an officer can conduct a search if he has 
“reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual”). 
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case is that guns can be seized, at least temporarily, under both prongs: 
either as part of the stop, if the gun possession is unlawful, or as part of the 
frisk, if the firearm makes the person “presently dangerous.”151 
In the past, the assumption that a person carrying a concealed weapon 
was engaged in the crime of unlawful weapons possession allowed courts 
to uphold the disarming of an individual with little analysis. If police 
suspect that someone unlawfully possesses a firearm, it follows that the 
officer can remove the gun to discontinue the suspected crime. Critically, 
this means that confiscation of the weapon is justified under Terry’s first 
analytical prong (suspicion of a crime), not necessarily the second 
(suspicion of dangerousness). The weapon, once detected, is suspected 
contraband, and contraband can be seized upon detection.
152
  
As discussed above, the assumption that the mere possession of a 
firearm constitutes a crime is crumbling. This means that absent evidence 
that a person’s firearm possession is unlicensed, the first prong of Terry no 
longer justifies the seizure of the firearm. Police authority to disarm 
persons, then, will regularly depend on Terry’s second (“frisk”) prong. 
Under this prong, a police officer interacting with an armed member of the 
public will need “reasonable suspicion” that the person is “presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others” to seize the firearm.153 Courts may 
agree that the inherent dangers of firearms make this showing essentially 
automatic whenever officers encounter armed persons in public.
154
 But 
given Terry’s requirement of “specific and articulable facts” to justify a 
stop or frisk, that is hardly a foregone conclusion.
155
 And if courts do not 
 
 
 151. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 364 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Terry for the 
proposition that “officers had authority to seize the [defendant’s] firearm to ensure their safety”). 
 152. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376 (1993) (holding that an officer engaged in 
lawful activity who encounters contraband can seize the contraband, “[r]egardless of whether the 
officer detects the contraband by sight or by touch”). 
 153. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 30. 
 154. See United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “Officer 
Ferragamo’s reasonable suspicion that Orman was carrying a gun [was] all that is required for a 
protective search under Terry”); Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment 
“Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1692 (1998) (reading Justice Harlan’s concurrence in 
Terry to suggest “that the stop of a suspect is itself a critical event that almost automatically generates 
a dangerousness concern that authorizes a weapons frisk of the suspect”); cf. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408, 415 (1997) (crafting blanket rule that it is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for “an 
officer making a traffic stop” to “order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the 
stop”). 
 155. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 410 (Ariz. 2014) (“In a state such as 
Arizona that freely permits citizens to carry weapons, both visible and concealed, the mere presence of 
a gun cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that the gun carrier is presently 
dangerous.”); Harris, supra note 114, at 58 (“[P]olice cannot assume the existence of danger just 
because a person carries a gun.”). 
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accept this blanket assumption of dangerousness, officers will be forced to 
interact with armed citizens on equal terms (i.e., both parties are armed). 
That fact itself may discourage investigations of armed individuals more 
than any of the legal doctrines discussed above. The most common 
reaction of officers in the new gun-friendly era to tips, observations, or 
discoveries of concealed weapons may be to steer clear. 
III. GUN POLICING IN AN ERA OF CONCEALED CARRY 
The previous Parts explain how expanding Second Amendment rights 
trigger Fourth Amendment protections that jeopardize traditional (and 
futuristic) urban gun-policing tactics. But city officials will not easily 
abandon crime-prevention techniques that they believe save lives. This 
Part analyzes the constitutionality of responses policymakers might adopt 
to try to continue proactive, gun-oriented policing in an era of concealed 
carry. A starting point for these efforts will undoubtedly be the empirical 
data on the relative rarity of crimes committed by licensed gun carriers. 
A. The Relatively Small Danger Posed by Licensed Gun Carriers 
Although there is a robust debate about the effect of gun carrying on 
crime,
156
 there is general consensus that licensed gun possessors rarely use 
their firearms to commit violent street crimes such as robberies or 
murders.
157
 Thus, even if licensed gun carriers swarm city streets in the 
wake of the legal changes chronicled above, strategies to suppress murders 
 
 
 156. See, e.g., COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND 
VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 2 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2004) (“[D]espite a large body of 
research, the committee found no credible evidence that the passage of right-to-carry laws decreases or 
increases violent crime.”). 
 157. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937–38 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Philip J. Cook, Jens 
Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare 
Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041, 1082 (2009) (“The available data about permit holders also 
imply that they are at fairly low risk of misusing guns, consistent with the relatively low arrest rates 
observed to date for permit holders.”)); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New 
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139, 1245 (1996) (noting that “[t]he homicide 
data collected over the past thirty-five years have consistently shown that 70–80% of those charged 
with murder had prior adult records, with an average adult criminal career of six or more years, 
including four major adult felony arrests,” with a significant portion of the remainder, about 14%, 
being juveniles); Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of 
Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L. REV. 513, 579–80 (1995) (discussing empirical literature that shows “it 
simply is not true that previously law abiding citizens commit most murders or many murders or 
virtually any murders” (or other violent crimes), but rather “approximately 75% of murderers have 
adult criminal records,” with the remainder made up largely of juveniles); Vernick et al., supra note 
26, at 568 (noting that “permit holders tend to be a low-risk group for both offending and 
victimization”). 
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and robberies through gun detection may remain viable so long as police 
can lawfully distinguish licensed from unlicensed gun carriers and disarm 
only the latter group. 
Statistics published by the State of Texas reflect that people with 
concealed handgun licenses (CHL) commit only a small fraction of the 
street crime associated with public weapons possession.
158
 For example, of 
the roughly 4,000 people convicted for robbery or aggravated robbery in 
Texas in 2011, only two possessed a CHL.
159
 The same 2011 Texas data 
shows that CHL carriers included four (of over 500) convicted murderers, 
three (of 112) people convicted of manslaughter, and three (of 2,765) 
people convicted of assault with a deadly weapon.
160
 This data shows that 
the vast majority of these crimes and others like them appear to be 
committed by people who do not possess a license to carry a firearm. To 
the extent these offenses are committed with guns, the perpetrators are 
almost always unlicensed. 
The relatively low incidence of violent crimes committed by licensed 
gun carriers fits with other data about the link between guns and crime. 
Many of those most likely to commit firearm violence, in particular 
teenagers and felons, cannot lawfully obtain a license even if they were so 
inclined.
161
 Federal law criminalizes firearm possession by juveniles 
(under age eighteen), fugitives, felons, domestic violence misdemeanants, 
drug users, certain persons with mental illness, and those illegally present 
in the country.
162
 State licensing regimes provide overlapping and 
sometimes broader prohibitions.
163
 
Empirical evidence supports the intuition that those disqualified from 
possessing a firearm are among the most likely to use guns unlawfully. In 
 
 
 158. REGULATORY SERV. DIV., TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, CONVICTION RATES FOR 
CONCEALED HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS (2012), available at http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/RSD/C 
HL/Reports/ConvictionRatesReport2011.pdf (reporting statistics for 2011 calendar year). 
 159. Id. at 1, 3. 
 160. Id. at 1–2; Florida provides statistics on the number of firearms revoked. The summary is not 
a model of clarity, but appears to record 168 license revocations, out of over 1 million active licenses, 
since 1987 for improper utilization of the firearm. DIV. OF LICENSING, FLA. DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND 
CONSUMER SERVS., CONCEALED WEAPON OR FIREARM LICENSE SUMMARY REPORT, OCTOBER 1, 
1987–MARCH 31, 2015 (2015), available at http://www.freshfromflorida.com/content/download/7499/ 
118851/cw_monthly.pdf.  
 161. CDC, supra note 25, at 573 (finding that the youth (under nineteen) committed a 
disproportionate number of firearm homicides); Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the 
Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 10, 25 (1995) (noting “steady growth in the use 
of guns by juveniles” to commit homicides beginning in 1985); see also COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, 
supra note 156. 
 162. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2013); 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2), (5) (defining juveniles as those under 18). 
 163. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172 (2013); see generally GAO Report, supra note 
20, at 14–15 (surveying state licensing requirements). 
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2001, the Department of Justice studied state and federal inmates who had 
committed serious crimes with firearms.
164
 The authors determined that 
federal law likely barred over eighty percent of these inmates from 
possessing a firearm at the time they committed a gun crime.
165
 About half 
of the inmates had previously been incarcerated for a serious offense, 
about a third were on probation or parole at the time of their gun crime, 
and a small but significant percentage had potentially disqualifying mental 
health issues.
166
 In addition, close to sixty percent of the inmates who used 
a firearm reported using illegal drugs shortly before committing their 
offense—although the likelihood that this disqualifying factor would 
actually have prevented issuance of a gun license is small, since periodic 
drug testing is not (yet) included in licensing regimes.
167
 Furthermore, 
there is reason to suspect that even among eligible citizens, many of those 
most likely to commit violent crimes will fail to obtain a license. People 
planning unlawful activity (e.g., premeditated killers) or immersed in it 
(e.g., drug dealers) may eschew licenses to minimize official scrutiny. 
Thus, there is empirical and theoretical support for the proposition that 
police can achieve a large proportion of the goals of traditional gun-
oriented policing by disarming unlicensed gun carriers even if licensed 
gun carrying remains prevalent. The challenge is crafting a lawful 
mechanism for police officers to distinguish licensed from unlicensed gun 
carriers. 
B. Policing-Friendly Licensing Regimes? 
Even as it expanded gun rights in recent years, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited” and thus can be regulated.168 As early as the country’s 
 
 
 164. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 189369, FIREARM USE BY 
OFFENDERS (2001). 
 165. Id. at 10. 
 166. Id. (six to ten percent); see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (prohibiting gun possession by a 
person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental 
institution”). Another significant potentially disqualifying factor was non-citizen status (five to eight 
percent). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 164, at 10; see also COMM. ON LAW & JUSTICE, 
supra note 156. 
 167. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 164, at 10; see generally GAO Report, supra 
note 20 (discussing common state licensing requirements). 
 168. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . .”); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting with approval statement in amicus brief that 
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founding, many jurisdictions severely restricted firearm possession, 
including concealed firearms.
169
 In fact, many state constitutional 
provisions affirm the legislature’s ability to “enact laws to prevent persons 
from carrying concealed weapons.”170 The Texas Constitution most clearly 
reflects this longstanding connection between gun regulation and crime, 
stating: “[e]very citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the 
lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have 
power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent 
crime.”171  
 In light of the permissibility of regulation, jurisdictions that seek to 
preserve police authority to detect and deter unlawful gun possession can 
try to construct permissive licensing regimes that nonetheless aid police in 
distinguishing licensed from unlicensed gun possessors. This Part analyzes 
two possible strategies cities may employ in an effort to achieve the goals 
of traditional urban gun policing in a new gun-friendly constitutional and 
statutory landscape.  
1. High Minimum Age Requirements 
If forced to license gun possession, cities seeking to prevent gun 
violence could react by imposing a high minimum age for obtaining a 
concealed handgun permit. Federal law already imposes a de facto 
minimum by prohibiting possession of a handgun by anyone under the age 
of eighteen.
172
 A minimum age provides officers with “reasonable 
suspicion” to stop gun carriers who appear to be younger than the 
 
 
“‘[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the 
Second Amendment’”). 
 169. Michael A. Bellesiles, Firearms Regulation: A Historical Overview, 28 CRIME & JUST. 137, 
155 (2001) (“Every state had gun control legislation on its books at the time the Second Amendment 
was approved. Every state continued to pass such legislation after the Second Amendment became the 
law of the land, and they were joined in such regulatory efforts by the federal government, starting [in] 
1792.”); Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths 
from Historical Realities, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1726 (2012) (“A broad range of restrictions on 
the use of arms in public, including bans on the right to carry in public, emerged in the decades after 
the adoption of the Second Amendment.”). 
 170. KY. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1; see also David B. Kopel, The Supreme Court’s Thirty-Five 
Other Gun Cases: What the Supreme Court Has Said About the Second Amendment, 18 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 99, 114 & n.43 (1999) (providing now-outdated list of constitutional provisions of the 
“[f]orty-four states [that] guarantee a right to arms in their state constitution,” which reflects explicit 
authority to regulate concealed weapons possession in Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, and North Carolina). 
 171. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 23; see also English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 478 (1872) (interpreting 
earlier version of similar constitutional language). 
 172. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A), (5) (2013). 
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specified age. The higher the minimum age, the more (underage) gun 
carriers the police can stop on this basis. 
Currently, the most common (and highest) statewide minimum age for 
concealed carry licenses is twenty-one,
173
 although many states with the 
twenty-one-year minimum reduce the minimum age to eighteen for people 
who are serving or have served in the military.
174
 States also commonly 
recognize permits from other jurisdictions, where the legal age for 
concealed carry may be only eighteen.
175
 As a result, police in many cities 
cannot assume that even armed eighteen-year-olds are carrying handguns 
unlawfully. 
A state law or municipal ordinance raising the minimum age to twenty-
one, without exception, would expand the universe of persons police can 
lawfully stop on suspicion of unlawful gun possession. In fact, cities could 
justify a significantly higher minimum concealed carry age. Social 
scientists define the upper bound of adolescence, a time of increased risk-
taking, as age twenty-five.
176
 Consistent with this demarcation, the 
Department of Justice recently reported that “[f]rom 2002 to 2011, young 
adults ages 18 to 24 had the highest homicide [offender] rate of any age 
group . . . .”177 This demographic pattern holds across other crimes, such 
 
 
 173. Brief of Amici Curiae Brady Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence et al. at 20–21 & n.11, NRA v. 
McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-10091), 2012 WL 9085244 (explaining that thirty-
eight states either prohibit concealed weapons possession or require applicants to be at least twenty-
one to receive a concealed carry license, and listing pertinent statutes); David B. Kopel, Pretend 
“Gun-Free” School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515, 521 (2009) (“[I]n the large 
majority of ‘Shall Issue’ states the minimum age for being able to apply for a permit is twenty-one. 
There are six ‘Shall Issue’ states in which the minimum age is eighteen.”). 
 174. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172(g) (2013) (extending eligibility to a person 
“who is at least 18 years of age but not yet 21 years of age” and is a member or veteran of the U.S. 
military); Safe Carry Protection Act, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1-7 (Ga. 2014) 
(amending GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-129 to provide that persons under twenty-one but at least eighteen 
years of age with military service can obtain a concealed carry license); see also MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 571.101.2(2) (2014) (same). 
 175. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.173 (2013) (providing for reciprocity with other 
states as negotiated by the Governor). Some states limit reciprocity to persons twenty-one years of age. 
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.014(A) (2015) (“A valid concealed handgun or concealed 
weapon permit or license issued by another state shall authorize the holder of such permit or license 
who is at least 21 years of age to carry a concealed handgun in the Commonwealth . . . .”); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 175.60(1)(g) (2015) (defining “[o]ut-of-state licensee” to be an “individual who is 21 years of 
age or over, who is not a Wisconsin resident, and who has been issued an out-of-state license”). 
 176. See, e.g., Diana Baumrind, A Developmental Perspective on Adolescent Risk Taking in 
Contemporary America, in ADOLESCENT SOCIAL BEHAV. AND HEALTH 97–98 (Charles E. Irwin, Jr. 
ed., 1987). 
 177. ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA COOPER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 243035, HOMICIDE IN THE 
U.S. KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2011 1 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/hus11.pdf; see also JAMES ALAN FOX & MARIANNE W. ZAWITZ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S. (2007), available at http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=966 
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as robbery and aggravated assault.
178
 Perhaps cognizant of these statistics, 
Missouri once prohibited anyone under age twenty-four from obtaining a 
concealed carry license, but lowered the minimum age to twenty-one in 
2011.
179
 As young people represent a significant chunk of gun 
offenders,
180
 an ordinance raising the minimum age for concealed carry 
within city limits would allow police to endeavor to suppress violent crime 
by disarming potential (youthful) offenders.  
In states where preemption is not a problem, cities could enact 
minimum age requirements through an ordinance or append the 
requirements to existing concealed carry licensing provisions. In cities 
where municipal gun regulations are preempted by state law, municipal 
lawmakers would need to clear the restrictions with state lawmakers. Their 
argument, in this context, would be straightforward. The higher the 
minimum age in a particular jurisdiction, the broader the category of 
armed people police would be able to stop and question, consistent with 
the Fourth Amendment, upon developing reasonable suspicion of 
(underage) gun carrying. 
Aside from the policy question of the appropriate minimum age for 
issuing a concealed carry license, there is a constitutional question as to 
the permissible bounds of such limits. The Supreme Court has not yet 
addressed the constitutionality of conditioning firearm possession on a 
minimum age. The federal appeals courts have thus far rejected post-
Heller challenges to federal and state restrictions that burden the Second 
 
 
(showing that almost half of homicide offenders were under the age of twenty-four, while only sixteen 
percent were over thirty-four, and explaining that “[y]oung adults (18–24 years -old) have historically 
had the highest offending rates and their rates nearly doubled from 1985 to 1993”); Alfred Blumstein 
& Joel Wallman, The Crime Drop and Beyond, 2006 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 125, 132 & fig.6 
(highlighting disproportionate use of handguns in murders committed by juveniles and persons aged 
eighteen to twenty-four). 
 178. The FBI publishes a breakdown of arrests by age that reveals a pattern of escalating violent 
crime in the late teenage years with the prevalence of robberies peaking at age eighteen, intentional 
homicides at age twenty, and aggravated assaults at age twenty-one. For each crime, the incidences by 
age gradually tail off, but remain high at least until age twenty-four. See FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2012 tbl.38, available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-
2012/tables/38tabledatadecoverviewpdf. 
 179. See 32 ROBERT H. DIERKER, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW § 41.10 
(2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2015) (relying on prior statute to state that “[p]ersons under the age of 23” are 
unable to obtain permits); MO. REV. STAT. § 571.101.2(2) (2014) (requiring applicants to be at least 
twenty-one); Jason Hancock, Missouri Senate Passes Bill to Drop Minimum Age for Concealed Carry 
Permit, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 12, 2011, at A5 (reporting on passage of bill in Missouri 
Senate to reduce “[t]he age requirement to obtain a conceal-and-carry firearm permit . . . from 23 to 
21”). 
 180. See sources cited supra note 161. 
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Amendment rights of those under twenty-one, including a prohibition on 
the issuance of concealed carry licenses.
181
 The courts emphasize that 
restricting young people’s access to handguns serves a legitimate state 
interest and that age-related burdens are only temporary.
182
 But the 
ultimate test of such restrictions at the Supreme Court level may well be a 
historical one, and portions of the historical record already cited by the 
majority in Heller reference eighteen as the pertinent cutoff.
183
 
Consequently, while age-related restrictions on concealed weapons 
carrying may make policy sense, their constitutionality remains an open 
question. 
2. “Gun-License Inquiries” 
Local governments compelled to issue concealed carry licenses may 
also react by enhancing the authority of police to investigate the 
lawfulness of public gun possession. Statutes along these lines already 
exist in some states, and will likely proliferate in the new era of concealed 
carry. Specifically, jurisdictions seeking to facilitate police investigation 
of firearm possession will (or already do) incorporate the following three 
provisions into their concealed carry licensing regulations: 
(1) a requirement that gun carriers carry their licenses in public; 
(2) a condition of the license that license holders present their 
license to police upon request;
184
 
(3) a database that an officer can query to confirm the validity of 
licenses.
185
  
 
 
 181. See NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting constitutional challenge to 
Texas law prohibiting public handgun possession by persons under twenty-one); NRA v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 209 (5th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter BATFE] 
(rejecting constitutional challenge to restrictions on commercial firearm sales to persons under twenty-
one).  
 182. See BATFE, 700 F.3d at 207; McCraw, 719 F.3d at 347–48.  
 183. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 596 (2008) (determining content of Second 
Amendment provisions through historical analysis and noting, along the way, that Congress’ first 
Militia Act specified members of the militia as people who “shall be of the age of eighteen years”). 
 184. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3112(A)-(C) (2015) (requiring licensees “to carry the 
permit” and “present the permit for inspection to any law enforcement officer on request”); D.C. CODE 
§ 7-2502.08(c) (2015) (same); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.205 (2013) (same); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-308.01(A) (2015) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60(2g)(b)-(c) (2015) (same); cf. NEW YORK 
CITY, N.Y., RULES tit. 38, § 5-22(6) (2014) (“The licensee shall be in possession of her/his license at 
all times while carrying, transporting, possessing at residence, business, or authorized small arms 
range/shooting club, the handgun(s) indicated on said license.”). 
 185. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.07(A) (2015) (requiring permit information to be entered into 
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This three-tiered licensing suite purports to authorize police who lawfully 
detect a concealed weapon (either by a citizen’s tip, weapons-detection 
technology, or observation) to approach the firearm carrier and request a 
license. If the person produces a valid license, the officer’s suspicion of a 
weapons-possession offense will be dispelled. If the person does not 
produce a valid license, the officer now possesses at least “reasonable 
suspicion” of a violation of the firearm licensing laws. The officer could 
confiscate the firearm and arrest the suspected offender. 
It is not clear, however, that the licensing framework described above 
can survive constitutional scrutiny. The framework’s constitutionality 
depends on whether police can compel gun carriers to stop what they are 
doing and produce a firearm license.
186
 Courts have accepted an analogous 
licensing framework in the motor vehicle context, where drivers are 
routinely arrested for failing to produce a valid driver’s license upon an 
officer’s request,187 but as noted below there is a significant distinction.  
Cases from the driving context consistently consider requests for a 
driver’s license after a person has been lawfully stopped.188 The same 
qualification appears in the Supreme Court case most directly on point, 
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada.
189
 There, the Court held 
that a state could criminalize a person’s failure to identify himself to a 
police officer in the context of an otherwise lawful Terry stop.
190
 As long 
as the request for information “has an immediate relation to the purpose, 
rationale, and practical demands of a Terry stop,” and the stop was 
 
 
a database “so that the permit’s existence and current status will be made known to law-enforcement 
personnel accessing the Network for investigative purposes”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.60(12)(a)-(b) 
(2015) (providing for database that can be queried “to confirm that a license . . . is valid” and when “an 
individual is carrying a concealed weapon and claims to hold a valid license . . . but does not have his 
or her license document or certification card, to confirm that the individual holds a valid license or 
certification card”); but see Safe Carry Protection Act, H.R. 60, 152d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
§ 1-7(k) (Ga. 2014) (prohibiting “multijurisdictional data base of information regarding persons issued 
weapons carry licenses”). 
 186. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring) (“[T]he person stopped is not 
obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an 
arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.”). 
 187. See, e.g., Williams v. Vasquez, 62 F. App’x 686, 690 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
constitutionality of stop where officer possessed probable cause to arrest for “failure to produce a valid 
driver’s license and failure to produce proof of insurance”); Wos v. Sheahan, 57 F. App’x 694, 696 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“When Mr. Wos failed to produce a valid license . . . deputies had probable cause to 
believe he had violated the law and to arrest him.”). 
 188. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that without “at least articulable 
and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed . . . , stopping an automobile and detaining the 
driver in order to check his driver’s license . . . [is] unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment”).  
 189. 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004). 
 190. Id. at 187–88. 
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“justified at its inception,” a mandatory request to identify oneself falls 
within the bounds of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
191
  
Regulations that authorize gun-license inquiries can be distinguished 
from laws requiring the production of drivers’ licenses and the regulation 
upheld in Hiibel. Gun-license-inquiry provisions purport to authorize 
police to request a license prior to the officer’s development of 
“reasonable suspicion” to suspect a gun carrier of any offense. The proper 
analogy would be to a police officer pulling over a driver who had not 
violated any traffic law and asking the driver to produce a license; or 
accosting Mr. Hiibel on the street and requesting his name based on a 
hunch that he might be a fugitive. As these analogies show, existing case 
law does not support the constitutionality of state laws that mandate that 
an armed person queried by a police officer stop and provide a gun license. 
This is critical to an officer’s Fourth Amendment authority to investigate 
public gun possession. If the police cannot constitutionally require gun 
carriers to produce a license, officers cannot consider a failure to respond 
to a voluntary license inquiry as a basis for “reasonable suspicion.”192 
To the extent the “gun-license inquiries” already present in state codes, 
and likely to proliferate in coming years, purport to provide police with 
authority to stop gun carriers, they constitute a novel and as-yet-untested 
augmentation of traditional Fourth Amendment investigative bounds. As 
will be discussed below, whether this authority will survive the legal 
developments described in Parts I and II is an open question. Importantly, 
though, gun-license inquiries are only vulnerable to constitutional 
challenge when unlawful gun possession is the sole justification for the 
stop. As described in Part I.B.2, police already seek out unlicensed gun 
possession by stopping people on suspicion of committing non-gun 
offenses, such as trespassing. If an officer comes across a gun in the 
context of a lawful stop for some other violation (e.g., bicycling on the 
sidewalk), a gun-license inquiry would likely survive constitutional 
scrutiny, just as the name inquiry during an otherwise lawful stop survived 
 
 
 191. Id. at 188. 
 192. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (“[A] refusal to cooperate, without more, 
does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”); INS v. 
Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (emphasizing that no seizure occurred when INS agents’ conduct 
“should have given respondents no reason to believe that they would be detained if they gave truthful 
answers to the questions put to them or if they simply refused to answer”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47, 53 (1979) (holding that a seizure conducted to “require [Brown] to identify himself violated the 
Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was 
engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct”); State v. Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72, 82 (Wis. 2000) 
(emphasizing that because encounter was consensual, suspect’s “refusal to answer [an officer’s 
questions] would not have given rise to any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing”). 
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constitutional scrutiny in Hiibel.
193
 This raises the specter that police 
seeking out unlicensed firearm carriers may be pushed by more robust 
Second Amendment protections toward pretextual stops and arrests (see 
Part I.B.2), rather than less intrusive and more direct means of gun 
detection, such as gun scanners. 
The best argument for the constitutionality of gun-license inquiries 
invokes the generic Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” command. The 
Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes that the ultimate constitutional test 
of a Fourth Amendment search or seizure is “reasonableness,” and that 
reasonableness depends on balancing “the public interest and the 
individual’s right to personal security.”194 Applying this standard, the 
Justices could find gun-license-inquiry stops “reasonable” given the 
government’s interest in assessing the lawfulness of guns detected by 
police in public spaces.
195
 Likely factors cited in evaluating this balance 
would be: the licensee’s prior agreement as a condition of obtaining a gun 
license to display a license upon request; the relatively brief and non-
intrusive nature of the stop; the stop would occur in public;
196
 and licensed 
gun carriers could readily and predictably conclude the encounter by 
showing a valid license.
197
 The Court’s precedents dictate analyzing the 
intrusion from the perspective of someone lawfully carrying a firearm.
198
 
 
 
 193. 542 U.S. at 188. 
 194. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50–51; United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (quoting 
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (“[R]easonableness of a search is determined ‘by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the 
other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”)); 
Bellin, supra note 57, at 37–39 (emphasizing malleability of Fourth Amendment rules interpreting 
reasonableness command). 
 195. See United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (ruling that the possibility 
of unlawful possession of the weapon “was sufficient to justify briefly stopping [suspect] before 
inquiring” about whether he had “a valid concealed-weapons permit”); Nichols v. Harris, 17 F. Supp. 
3d 989, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting challenge to California law that criminalizes refusal to allow 
a police officer to assess whether a handgun observed in public is loaded because: “[a] chamber check 
is arguably not a ‘search’ because it does not infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy and even 
if it is, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because such a search is reasonable”); People v. 
DeLong, 90 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196 (Ct. App. 1970) (emphasizing that a chamber check is “limited to a 
single purpose”; “does not have about it any except the slightest element of embarrassment or 
annoyance, elements overbalanced by far by the purpose of preventing violence or threats of 
violence”; and its “minimal instrusion does not begin to approach the indignity of the frisk”). 
 196. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (emphasizing that “the typical traffic stop is 
public, at least to some degree,” in deciding that traffic stops did not constitute custody for Miranda 
purposes). 
 197. Cf. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980) (emphasizing that approach of 
law enforcement to ask for ticket and identification in airport concourse “did not amount to an 
intrusion upon any constitutionally protected interest” where, inter alia, “[t]he events took place in the 
public concourse” and were non-coercive).  
 198. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991) (explaining that “the ‘reasonable person’ 
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Nevertheless, the framework described above would place a unique 
burden on handgun carriers. The significance of this burden depends on 
how effective gun-detection methods become and the type of policy police 
adopt for reacting to detected guns. If police become very effective (for 
example, by using gun-detecting technology) and respond to each “hit” by 
requesting a license, gun possessors would be subjected to routine stops in 
public, accompanied by mandatory requests to display their license. The 
stops may be intrusive if police employ more than a simple verbal request 
(e.g., physical contact, handcuffs, drawn weapons, or multiple officers). 
From an officer’s perspective, a polite request may be too passive as “the 
answer to the question propounded by the policeman may be a bullet.”199 
A city policing effort that leads to routine and invasive gun-license 
inquiries could constitute such a burden on gun possession that the 
policing practice itself violates the Second Amendment, even if the 
underlying stops were deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
If gun-detection efforts are more haphazard, or officers exercise 
discretion in choosing to stop a small proportion of detected gun 
possessors, the burden on Second Amendment rights becomes less acute. 
But this easing of the Second Amendment burden raises familiar worries 
about police discretion and racial profiling, generating Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendment questions.
200
 Already, critics of law enforcement 
perceive that “in America’s style of policing, gun or appearance of a gun 
in . . . possession of a person of color equals criminal.”201  
CONCLUSION 
In the wake of Heller and parallel legislative initiatives that make the 
country increasingly concealed carry friendly, urban police departments 
must adapt to a new era of lawful gun possession, including lawfully-
carried, concealed handguns in crowded public areas. Cities previously 
 
 
test [for purposes of assessing whether a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred] presupposes an 
innocent person”). 
 199. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63–64 (1968) (quoting People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32, 
35 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1964)). 
 200. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 1535–49 (concluding that New York City’s gun-policing efforts 
violated Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).  
 201. Former Officer: Policing Takes Patience, but Black Suspects Get Little, NPR (Dec. 12, 2014, 
5:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/12/370264858/former-officer-policing-takes-patience-but-
black-suspects-get-little (quoting former NYPD officer and now Brooklyn Borough president, Eric 
Adams); H. A. Goodman, Three Reasons Why Black Men Should Openly Carry a Gun After Trayvon, 
Ferguson and John Crawford, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2014, 3:12 AM), http://www.huffington 
post.com/h-a-goodman/three-reasons-why-black-m_b_6245962.html (commenting that police shooting 
“signifies that . . . the mere sight of a black man with a gun instantly equated to danger”). 
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committed to preventing violent street crime by detecting and deterring 
public gun carrying are not likely to give up these strategies entirely. 
Rather, many urban police forces will try to replicate traditional gun-
policing regimes by focusing on detecting and deterring unlicensed gun 
carrying. Yet the Fourth Amendment places a series of hurdles in the way 
of officers attempting to lawfully distinguish between licensed and 
unlicensed handgun possessors. Depending on how the case law unfolds, 
these obstacles may be insurmountable. As a result, we may be witnessing 
the beginning of the end of a form of proactive gun policing long viewed 
by city residents and their police chiefs as essential to public safety. 
Indeed, the nascent “right to remain armed” may, with shockingly little 
fanfare, become one of the pivotal cultural changes in the relationship 
between America’s police and its citizens. The implications, legal and 
otherwise, of this change are impossible to forecast with precision, but a 
serious conversation about them is long overdue. There is no sign that 
judges and legislators are aware of the dramatic implications of sweeping 
gun rights for American policing and little indication that scholars are 
focused on the powerful Fourth Amendment implications of resurgent 
Second Amendment rights. 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
